

THE PASSION STORY
From Visual Representation to Social Drama

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Epilogue:
A Brief History of Jewish Enmity

DAVID NIRENBERG

“The Passion of the Christ,” that is, the death of Jesus and the birth of his movement, represents a focal point in the history of a cosmology that pits the forces of truth and spirituality against the tyranny of an evil materialism imagined as Jewish. It is true that since World War II it has not been fashionable, in the United States at least, to exploit too explicitly the possibilities of this cosmology, whether in politics or in religion. But this restraint is historically exceptional. The cultural logic that imagines a cosmic struggle against the limitations of the material world in terms of a struggle against Jewish enmity was already partly formulated in antiquity and has been pressed into service on behalf of any number of religious and political movements across the centuries, from early Christianity to contemporary Islamism. In this sense there is a very long history to Mel Gibson’s casting of the worldly evil that persecutes divine goodness as exaggeratedly Jewish.

I should clarify what I mean by “exaggerated.” Gibson’s decision to represent the paradigmatic contest between God and godliness, on the one hand, and evil in the form of a malevolent Judaism, on the other, is often defended as an expression of his belief in the Gospels as historical and divine truth. We should not let such a defense blind us to the ways in which Gibson’s directorial choices themselves deliberately exaggerate both the violence of God’s enemies (what Gospel so lovingly elaborates upon tortures and cruelties?) and their “Jewishness.” One does not need to be a New Testament scholar, for example, to know that the Evangelists did not produce that terrifying scene in which seemingly innocent Jewish children are transformed into monstrous demons who hound Judas to death. Gibson’s cinematographic choices and the images they produce are not reflections of biblical or historical truth, but of a particular vision of the world, a vision that, if the enthusiastic reception of his film is any indication, has renewed resonance today. Other essays in this volume (such as James Marrow’s piece on Passion iconography) have introduced us to the history of some of the images produced by this vision in other times and places.

This essay, on the other hand, provides a brief history of the vision itself, sketching, from antiquity to the present, the development of what I am calling a cosmology of Jewish enmity. We could also call this cosmology “anti-Semitism” if we understand that word to mean something quite specific: not negative stereotypes about Jews, not prejudice, not even social discrimination (though all of these can be part of it), but the idea that the world and its conflicts can be understood as a struggle for emancipation from the tyranny of the Jew. This struggle is not against a real Jew or a real tyranny. With the sole exception of the Occupied Territories today, it has been fought in lands whose ruling powers were not Jewish but pagan, Christian, Muslim, and so forth. In fact, it has most often been fought in lands with practically no Jews at all, as in Japan, the Muslim world, and much of Europe in the present day.¹ Jewish tyranny is a fictional tyranny. But although there has never been a Jewish tyrant (outside perhaps of biblical Israel or contemporary Palestine) or a Jewish plan for world domination, innumerable people since ancient times have found it useful to believe in one, and its existence has become a crucial axiom in the systems of thought many societies have used to impose order on the world. Of course, each of these logics took root in its own historical soil. The Evangelist Matthew, the Prophet Muhammad, the philosopher Marx—all have made arguments in very different cultures and contexts. Yet all share a common language of emancipation from tyrannical Judaism.

How did this language focused on a tiny people ever become a convincing representation of global reality? Our story begins in the ancient world. That world has bequeathed us countless artifacts of antipathy toward Jews: negative stereotypes, conflict and conquest, even expulsion and extermination. Yet it has proved very difficult to reassemble these into anything resembling an ideology. Most ancient cultures attributed relatively little importance to the difference between Jew and non-Jew. For hundreds of years, for example, Assyrians and Babylonians were at war with the Israelite kingdoms. After the Babylonian conquest of Jerusalem in the sixth century B.C.E., thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of Jews lived in slavery, exile, or willingly in Diaspora in Babylon, with many assimilating into Babylonian society. The encounter was so central to the Israelite experience that Babylon assumed cosmological significance in biblical prophecy. But the reverse is untrue. So far as we know, the Israelites played no special role in shaping how Babylonians thought of themselves or their world.

The one exception to this rule of Jewish insignificance is Egypt. In Egypt, at some point before 400 B.C.E. and for reasons historians have been arguing about for two thousand years, people began to tell a story about the origins of the Jews, a “negative” Egyptian version of the Exodus and Passover stories. According to this story, the lepers of Egypt had allied with alien invaders called the Hyksos (Shepherds) in order to take over Egypt. They ruled the country violently and tyrannically, oppressing the Egyptians, destroying their temples, and roasting their priests. Their reign of terror ended only with their defeat and expulsion from Egypt, into the lands around Jerusalem. There they practiced the religion taught them by their leader, a renegade priest of the Egyptian sun god who took the name of Moses, instructed his people to despise all other peoples and their gods, and made them misanthropes, enemies not just of Egypt but of all mankind.²

It is amazing how many of the root claims of anti-Semitism are already present here, in its earliest Egyptian articulation. This anti-Judaism became an increasingly important tool as Egyptians asserted their aspirations and identity in the face of conquest and rule first by Persians, then by Greeks, and finally by Romans. For example, the Egyptian heroes known as the Alexandrian martyrs made their reputations by accusing Roman emperors of being Jew lovers (Trajan) and sons of Jewish whores (Claudius). From our vantage point as citizens of an “imperial Zionist Satan,” many of these Egyptian stories about the Romans seem eerily familiar. Their ending, too, may seem famil-

iar. In 115–17 C.E., Roman legions and Egyptian militias destroyed the Jewish population of Egypt, estimated by Philo of Alexandria a century before at one million strong. The importance of this victory over the Jews for Egyptians of the day is evident in the arresting fact that, a hundred years later, citizens of Egyptian towns were still celebrating it in an annual feast. So far as we know, this is the only victory in their remembered history that the citizens of Roman Egypt honored with a holiday.³

But this story of Jewish enmity remained throughout antiquity more or less an Egyptian one. Certainly it was influential and spread throughout the ancient world, thanks first to Alexander the Great and his historians and then to the Romans and theirs. But only the Egyptians put the story at or near the center of their politics, defining their freedom against the tyranny of the Jew. Moreover, even for Egyptians the utility of this anti-Judaism was relatively limited. It could be deployed against real Jews, in situations of competition for power and privilege. But it was not yet a way of understanding the world, a cosmological language capable of classifying good and evil. To understand how it became such a language and how that language spread across much of the ancient world, we need to move from Egypt to the adjoining province of Judea and focus on the new Christian religion taking shape there.

The earliest Christian texts that we have are not the canonical Gospels (which scholars believe were all composed in the period between 70 and 110 C.E.) but the letters of Paul, and it is with them that we should begin. Saul the Pharisee's fall upon the road to Damascus and his subsequent recovery as Paul the follower of Jesus transformed the meaning of Jews and Judaism forever. Like other early Christians, Paul confronted two important "Jewish questions." The first had to do with the past. How was the ancient covenant given to Abraham and its textual expression in the form of the Hebrew Bible related to the new promise of Jesus? Could it be appropriated? Rejected? The second was a subquestion of the first. How should followers of Jesus act in the present? Should they or should they not observe Jewish practices and rituals?

Paul responded to these questions with an aggressive universalism: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you are Christ's then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise" (Gal. 3:28–29). Implicit here is a struggle for control over the Jewish past. Paul claimed to expand the category of Jew, of descendent of Abraham, in order to make room for all humanity. When the Jews refused to surrender their ancestry, they became

emblematic of a selfish and stubborn adherence to the conditions of the flesh, enemies of universalism, of the spirit, and of God. Paul did not believe this enmity to be permanent. His is a message of a necessary but temporary blindness produced by God for the salvation of the world (Rom. 9:17). Hence Paul's distinctive conception of "Jewish enmity": "As regards the gospel they are enemies of God, for your sake; but as regards election they are beloved for the sake of their forefathers" (Rom 11:28).⁴

What matters here is not so much Paul's conception of Jewish enmity as the method of argument by which he made his case. Paul turned to the Jewish Scriptures for evidence, but in his reading he arrayed word and meaning against each other in a hierarchy explicitly compared to that of flesh and spirit. The task of a reader was to penetrate beyond the "letter," the sign—the outer body, or literal meaning—of a text and into its inner, or spiritual, meaning. The inner meaning of Abraham's circumcision, for example, was "the righteousness which he had by faith while he was still uncircumcised" (Rom. 4:11). Such reading practices were standard among both Jews and Gentiles familiar with Greek philosophy. Writing a few years before Paul, the Jew Philo of Alexandria stressed the need to read for "the hidden meaning that appeals to the few who study spiritual characteristics, rather than bodily forms," and discussed the signification of circumcision in terms very similar to Paul's. But for Philo circumcision's spiritual meaning increased, rather than lessened, the necessity of the outer practice. Paul believed that once the inner meaning was understood, the literal meaning could be discarded: circumcision of the flesh became unnecessary. As he put it in Romans 7:5–6, "For when we were still in the flesh, our sinful passions, stirred up by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are fully freed from the law, dead to that in which we lay captive. We can thus serve in the new being of the Spirit and not the old one of the letter."⁵

For Paul, becoming a Christian meant leaving the Law, the letter, and even flesh itself behind. We can, like the early Christians and like modern scholars, argue about what we think this means and what Paul might have had in mind. But one thing that it clearly came to mean for nearly all *later* generations of Christians, if not for those of the first century, was that Jews were associated with legalism, literalism, and flesh. The many Jews who did not believe in Jesus Paul himself characterized as dead flesh, a body without spirit, a branch cut from the vine. But even though Israel's flesh was dead, it was still dangerous, because it was seductive and infectious. The problem

stemmed from the appeal that Jewish practice had for the many Gentiles that Paul was converting to the faith. Some of these Gentiles, perhaps seeking to emulate Jesus or perhaps under the influence of disciples and Evangelists with opinions different from Paul's, sought to practice some aspects of Jewish Law, among them circumcision. Paul saw such desires in Gentile converts as a horrifying symptom of literalism, evidence that they had not understood Christ's message or the practice of reading that conveyed it: "Now I, Paul, say to you," he wrote to the Gentile Christians of Galatia, "that if you receive circumcision, Christ will be of no advantage to you" (Gal. 5:2). Gentiles, Paul insisted, ought to become heirs of Abraham in the spirit without becoming Jews in the flesh. "To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God . . . and those who are in the flesh cannot please God" (Rom. 8:6–8).

Paul coined a new word, "Judaizing" (Gal. 2:14), to characterize the danger of Gentile Christian contagion by legalism, literalism, and carnality that so concerned him. We might even say that he invented a new theory of infection by Judaism (or at least so it would be understood by later generations). As he put it in a different context, "Do you not know that only a little yeast leavens the whole batch of dough" (1 Cor. 5:6)? This theory of the dangerous infectiousness of Judaism was an innovation, something completely lacking from other ancient ideas (like those of the Egyptians) about the dangers posed by Jews and Judaism, and it would have fateful consequences. But it is also important to remember what Paul the Pharisee did not do. He never aligned the Jews with Satan or opposed their world of Temple and covenant to God's. He never lost confidence in the imminence of their reacceptance, though he conditioned that acceptance on their conversion to Christ. Finally, he never rejected the practice of Jewish Law and ritual by Jewish believers in Christ. To the contrary, he himself seems to have continued to observe the Law, and it is to the Jewish Christians of Jerusalem that he sent his charity and that of the Gentiles among whom he preached, a charity that manifested itself in both material and spiritual terms. The next generation of Christian authors, those who produced the Gospels in the turbulent years following the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E., would reverse all of these positions.

There is a vast and contentious literature on how the authors of the Gospels, writing for the increasingly Gentile audience that made up the Christian faith after the fall of Jerusalem, thought about Jews and Judaism.⁶ For our purposes we need remember only three points. First, all the Gospel authors

stress the prophetically ordained enmity of the Jews or some representative subset of them, such as the scribes or Pharisees, not only toward Jesus and his followers but also toward God. Their hatred proves the truth of Jesus' message and defines his community as one of spirit. "You stubborn people . . . you are always resisting the Holy Spirit. . . . Can you name a single prophet your ancestors never persecuted? They killed those who foretold the coming of the Upright One, and now you have become his betrayers, his murderers" (Acts 7:51–52; cf. Acts 28:28; John 8:44–47).⁷

Second, that enmity is conceived of in terms of a disjuncture between outer and inner moral state. Matthew and Luke explore this disjuncture repeatedly through the theme of the Pharisees (mentioned twenty-nine times in Matthew, twenty-seven in Luke) and their hypocrisy. In the Sermon on the Mount, for example, Jesus preaches "the seven woes of the Pharisees," seven indictments that describe in deafening crescendo the different ways in which the Pharisees confuse appearance with reality. The last phrases are too memorable to summarize:

Alas for you, scribes, and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You are like whitewashed tombs that look handsome on the outside, but inside are full of the bones of the dead and every kind of corruption. In just the same way, from the outside you look upright, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness.

Alas for you, scribes, and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You build the sepulchers of the prophets and decorate the tombs of the upright, saying, "We would never have joined in shedding the blood of the prophets, had we lived in our ancestors' day.' So! Your own evidence tells against you! You are the children of those who murdered the prophets! Very well then, finish off the work that your ancestors began. (Matt. 23:27–32)

The Pharisees pretend to be heirs of the prophets and guardians of their tombs, when in fact they are tombs themselves, about to prove their own corruption and hypocrisy by sending yet another prophet to his grave. Here, as elsewhere in the Gospels, the ability of the murderous to appear holy represents the difficulty in this world of distinguishing the carnal from the spiritual, the good from the evil. The Pharisee and the Jew become a warning sign posted at the

dangerous gap between the created world of flesh as it appears in all of its confusion and the perfected world as it really is in the divine will.

Third, the conception of Jewish enmity in terms of hypocrisy allowed Matthew and Luke to expand and develop what I called Paul's theory of infection about how "Jewish" attributes could overwhelm the Christian. They summarized this theory with Paul's apt biological metaphor about the corrupting power of yeast. Matthew's version is particularly terrifying:

The disciples, having crossed to the other side, had forgotten to take any food. Jesus said to them, "Keep your eyes open, and be on your guard against the yeast of the Pharisees and the Sadducees." And they said among themselves, "It is because we have not brought any bread." Jesus knew it, and he said, "You have so little faith, why are you talking among yourselves about having no bread? Do you still not understand? . . . How could you fail to understand that I was not talking about bread? What I said was: Beware the yeast of the Pharisees and Sadducees." Then they understood that he was telling them to be on their guard, not against yeast for making bread, but against the teachings of the Pharisees and Sadducees. (Matt. 16:5–12; cf. Luke 12:1–2)

Here, at the very moment that Jesus warns his closest associates of the danger posed by the "Pharisaic" world, they nevertheless fall into the trap. Rather than understand his statement metaphorically and spiritually, as he intends, they understand it literally and materially, in the context of their own bodily hunger, and thereby fall into the error of the Pharisees. What could be more terrifying than the sight of Jesus' chosen disciples, under his own tutelage, nevertheless becoming infected by the literal carnal-mindedness of the Jews?

This example illustrates how the Jews became the exemplary and extreme representation of an incorrect attitude toward the world, of a basic confusion between the world as it is in the flesh and the world as it is in the spirit. It also demonstrates how anti-Judaism emerged as the foundation of a theory of knowledge capable of making sense of the cosmos. In this story about the dangers of yeast, the disciples' difficulties stem from a basic problem of linguistics. When we hear a word, how are we to know whether it refers literally to a thing or metaphorically to something else? How can we know if Jesus

meant "yeast" when he said "yeast," or if he meant "teachings"? Today, we have any number of philosophies of language to explain how words signify and how language creates meaning. The ancient world had its philosophies of language as well. Thinkers who, like Philo, were influenced by Greek philosophy thought of the relationship between the material "thing" a word referred to and its nonmaterial "higher meanings" (metaphor, allegory, etc.) as similar to the relationship between perishable flesh and eternal spirit. For Christians, the relationship came to be imagined powerfully as that between literal Jew and spiritual Christian. As Saint Augustine put it in his treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, when a Christian understood literally a word that should be understood metaphorically, he killed his soul by subjecting it to the flesh and entered into the blind slavery of the Jews.⁸

This is a very abstract example. But what I am suggesting is that the Gospel authors and the church fathers managed to convert the concept of Jewish enmity and hypocrisy from a tool useful only in specific political situations of competition with real Jews for real power into a general theory of knowledge capable of making "sense" of a complex world. At first this theory of knowledge served to explain to the members of a small sect why the bulk of the Jewish people did not accept the truth of their messiah's message, why Jerusalem was destroyed, why they were persecuted. Later, as the apocalypse was delayed and it became increasingly clear that elimination of the flesh, the letter, and the law within our human world was impossible, anti-Judaism became much larger than the Jews. For if these things were "Jewish," then Judaism could not be escaped in the material world. Everyone, even Christians, could be criticized as "Jewish" to the extent that they, for example, read literally or derived pleasure from the things of this world. Following this logic, Christians elevated anti-Judaism into a primary critical language capable of being deployed not only against Jews but also against other non-Christians (for example, against Islam, which Christians often treated as a Jewish heresy) and, above all, against fellow Christians. As such, anti-Judaism became infinitely more useful, for now it could be deployed in a vast array of conflicts that involved no real Jews at all.

So useful was the logic of anti-Judaism that it quickly "Judaized" the world. Shortly after the Holocaust, the German philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno wrote that to "call someone a Jew amounts to an instigation to work him over until he resembles the image."⁹ From the age of the Gospels to the present, Christians have been calling each other "Jew"

without pause. Nearly every Christian sect has called its rivals “Jews,” and nearly every Christian heresy was described, in the ever-growing encyclopedias of error compiled by church doctors, as derived from Judaism. Later in the Middle Ages the Roman Catholics cast the Greek Orthodox Church as Judaizing, while the Greek Orthodox reversed the charge. For Martin Luther it was the Catholic Church, with its canon law and its elaborate institutions, that was Jewish. For his Catholic opponents, it was Luther’s biblical literalism that Judaized.¹⁰

There is virtually no theological debate that could not be translated into terms of Judaism. And of course in a world that treated earthly government as an extension of divine kingship, there was no political problem that could not be translated into those terms as well. Did an emperor insist on upholding the letter of the law? Then, as Saint Ambrose put it to the Roman emperor Theodosius, “no good is in store for him, for that king has become a Jew.”¹¹ Was a medieval king concerned with maintaining his revenues or increasing the efficiency of tax collection? Then (as countless medieval kings discovered) he must have a Jewish advisor, a Jewish concubine, a secret Jewish parent, or at the very least Jewish inclinations.¹² So flexible were these arguments that they were even used in the early modern period to argue *against* Christian kingship and *for* the separation of church and state. According to Enlightenment philosophers like Spinoza and Locke, sovereigns who imposed Christianity and Christian law on their subjects were Judaizing by imitating Old Testament theocratic kings and seeking to compel the spirit through power over the flesh.¹³

In sum, insofar as anti-Judaism became a primary language for negotiating the balance between flesh and spirit, between real and ideal, it became a primary language of power. The force of that power could be directed against anyone identified as “Judaizer” or “Jew lover.” “I determine who is a Jew”: these words, plagiarized by the Nazi propagandist Goebbels from a late-nineteenth-century Austrian politician, were in some sense the aspiration of all who sought sovereign power in Christendom from the fourth century on.¹⁴ To name the Jew was to name the enemy and summon society’s defenses against him. But all would have understood as well that the sword cut both ways. Power could be amassed in the name of achieving freedom from Judaism, but it could also be resisted as compromised, materialist, and Jewish. For this reason anti-Semitism has always been as useful to the revolutionary as it is to the reactionary.

Given Christianity’s role in creating the powerful logic of anti-Semitism that I have been describing, it is something of a cruel irony that the Enlightenment, modernity, and secularization have done nothing to reduce that power but, on the contrary, have only increased it. Why is this so? Perhaps it is because a tension between flesh and spirit remains at the heart of so many secular philosophies and ideologies. The philosophers of enlightened modernity discarded much of the Christian theological trappings of this tension. They spoke, for example, of a “dialectics” between spirit and matter, rather than of “incarnation,” though the latter often served them as a model for the former. But they retained entire the negative extreme that had so well served theology. That is to say, they retained the Jews as negative foil, symbolizing the body’s complete alienation from the spirit. Thus Hegel found it meaningful to call Kant a “Jewish philosopher,” while for Karl Marx (“On the Jewish Question”) the Jew, whose God is money, best represented “the alienated essence of man’s labor and life.” Marx sounds very much like one of our early Christian theologians when he declares that this alienation had infected Christendom, that “the Christians have become Jews,” and that only his philosophy can produce “*the emancipation of society from Judaism*” (emphasis in text).¹⁵ In other words, anti-Semitism thrives on modernity because modern idealisms continue to fantasize the perfectability of the world in terms of achieving freedom from the Jew.

And what of Islam? It has often been claimed that Islam encountered anti-Semitism only in the colonial era, anti-Semitism it then adopted with enthusiasm in its struggles against European colonialism and Jewish Zionism. But if by anti-Semitism we mean the deployment of a complex logic of materialist Jewish enmity toward God and his prophets in order to make ontological sense of the world, then we should expect to find it at Islam’s very foundations, especially given the important influence of diverse Christian and Jewish sectarian communities in early Islam.¹⁶ As God puts it in Sūra 6, verse 112, of the Qur’an: “we have appointed unto every Prophet an adversary—devils of humankind and jinn who inspire in one another plausible discourse through guile.”

In the case of Muhammad, those adversaries are often the Jews. The longest Sūra of the Qur’an, for example, Sūra 2, “The Cow,” devotes many verses to a critique of the Jews, who pretend to be friends of God but are enemies of his Prophet. According to Islamic tradition, the Sūra was revealed at Medina, where Muhammad went after his expulsion from Mecca in order to establish the first Islamic polity, and it dwells on Jewish resistance to his rule. Muhammad eventually destroyed the Jews of Medina, killing most and

exiling the remainder, but not before he put them to the hard ideological labor of validating his claim to prophecy. Like the authors of the Gospels, Muhammad stresses that the Jewish Scriptures verified the truth of his message. The Jews refused to recognize this because they preferred material gain to spiritual truth. They had altered their Scriptures in exchange for money, suppressing the prophecies of Muhammad's mission. Again like the Gospel authors, Muhammad turned this rejection into proof of his message:

Such are those who buy the life of this world at the price of the world to come. Their punishment will not be lightened, nor will they have support.

And truly we gave to Moses the Scriptures, and we caused a train of messengers to follow after him, and we gave unto Jesus, son of Mary, clear proofs. . . . Is it ever so, that when there comes to you [Jews] a messenger from Allah with that which you yourselves do not desire, you grow arrogant, and some you disbelieve and some you slay? (Qur'an 2.86–87, alluding to Acts 7)

As in the Gospels, the materialist enmity of the Jews stands at the front of the Qur'an, and at the beginning of Muhammad's government, as proof of his message and of the rightness of his rule.

Sūra 2 also introduces another important group of enemies of God, namely those who pretend to believe but do not. This group, referred to throughout the Qur'an (but not in Sūra 2) as the hypocrites (Arabic *mūnāfiqun*), is closely tied to Judaism. The hypocrite is always *like* the Jew, *seduced* by the Jew ("O ye who believe! If ye obey a party of those who have received the Scripture they will make you disbelievers after your belief," 3.100), or *related* to the Jew ("those who are hypocrites, they tell their brethren who disbelieve among the People of the Scripture," 59.11). But—and the distinction is crucial—the hypocrite is not necessarily a *real* Jew.

On the contrary, the concept of hypocrisy developed in the Qur'an is useful precisely because it explains how "Jewish" attributes (lying, envy, enmity, greed, cowardice, preference for this world over the next) can infect the "non-Jewish" followers of God. It provides a theory of seduction capable of accounting for the fact that, despite the warnings of the prophets and the revelation of this "Scripture wherein there is no doubt," the world remains a

place in which truth and falsehood are easily confused. We are familiar with the principle from the Gospel treatment of the Pharisees: the hypocrite looks fair but is foul. In the words of Sūra 63, "The Hypocrites":

When the hypocrites come unto thee they say: "We bear witness that you are indeed Allah's messenger. . . . They make their faith a pretext so that they may turn [men] from the way of Allah. Verily, evil is that which they are wont to do, that is because they believed, then disbelieved, therefore their hearts are sealed so that they understand not. And when you see them their figures please you; and if they speak you give ear unto their speech. [They are] as though they were blocks of wood in striped cloaks. They deem every shout to be against them. They are the enemy, so beware of them. Allah confound them! How they are perverted! (63.1–4)

It is not difficult to see the resemblance between the similes of Sūra 63 and those of, for example, Matthew 23. The work done by these similes is also similar: the Qur'anic concept of the hypocrite made it possible to understand the dangerousness of the world in terms of the danger of Judaism. From its opening pages to its last Sūra (112, al-Ikhlās, "The Sincerity," traditionally understood as revealed against the rabbis), the development of one danger out of the other, of hypocrisy out of Judaism, is so central to the Qur'an that Jewish duplicity and enmity can fairly be called a basic axiom of Qur'anic ontology.

In the Gospels, this Jewish enmity had been an organizing theme in narrating and explaining the life and death of Jesus, and it is central to the biography of the Prophet Muhammad as well. The Qur'an itself has very little to say about the life of Muhammad: even his name occurs only four times in its pages (3:144, 33:40, 47:2, 48:29; and once as AḤMaD, 61:6).¹⁷ Rarely (e.g., Sūra 66) does the Qur'an explicitly situate its message within the context of the life of the Prophet who receives it, and even then it does not name him. Nevertheless, the life, doings, and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad are an immensely important source of authority in Islam, transmitted through traditions that in the eighth and ninth centuries were collated and shaped into genres of narrative biography (Sīra) of Muhammad. These biographers did not hesitate to organize Muhammad's life along the itinerary of Jewish enmity that texts like Acts 7 or Sura 2.86–87 marked as the path of every

true prophet. Muḥammad Ibn Ishāq (died A.H. 151/768 C.E.), one of the earliest of Muhammad's biographers, explained how the Christian hermit Bahīrā was the first to prophesy the future greatness of the child Muhammad. The hermit's only piece of advice to the orphan child's uncle and guardian: "protect him from the Jews, for if they find out he is a prophet they will surely try to kill him."¹⁸ Later, according to this same biographer, the Jews bewitched Muhammad, making him impotent for a year. Zaynab, daughter of al-Hārith, a Jewess of Khaybar described in some traditions as a wife of the Prophet, did even worse. She poisoned a roast lamb that she served to Muhammad. One of his companions ate greedily and died of the meal. Muhammad himself "took hold of the shoulder and chewed a morsel of it, but he did not swallow it." His prophetic prudence saved his life, though the poison began the illness that would eventually kill him. It is because of the Jewish poison he ate on the victory field of Khaybar that "the Muslims consider that the apostle died as a martyr, in addition to the prophetic office with which God honored him."¹⁹

Islamic tradition created a prophetic biography through stories like these, which gave Jewish names and faces to Muhammad's enemies. Upon their heads, as upon rocks spaced in a shallow river, Muhammad steps along the course of his prophetic career. The reconstruction of that career, achieved in large part through the naming of these enemies, also helped early Muslim exegetes in their interpretation of the Qur'an. Recall that the verses of the Qur'an rarely say anything about the time, place, or purpose of their revelation. By linking specific Qur'anic verses to specific stories about Muhammad's life, early Islamic exegetes created a context within which to interpret the verses. Often that context was an "anti-Jewish" one. As Ibn Ishāq puts it: "It was the Jewish rabbis who used to annoy the apostle with questions and introduce confusion, so as to confound the truth with falsity. The Qur'an used to come down in reference to these questions of theirs, though some of the questions about what was allowed and forbidden came from the Muslims themselves."²⁰

This all too brief treatment is meant to suggest that like the early Christians, albeit in different ways, early Islamic communities put Jewish enmity to the work of making sense of their world. And although in later medieval centuries the logic of anti-Judaism may not have been as frequently invoked in the Islamic world as it was in the Christian, its power and utility did not disappear.²¹ Consider only one medieval example, that of the great Muslim poet and theologian Ibn Ḥazm, who lived in Islamic Spain in the eleventh

century, a period and place that many scholars consider a "golden age" of Islamic tolerance for the Jews. Among his many writings, Ibn Ḥazm produced a multivolume work intended to show that the history of religion should be understood as an endless struggle of spirituality against Jews and Jewish materialism. For example, according to Ibn Ḥazm, the rabbis corrupted Christianity by convincing Saint Paul to preach the divinity of Jesus: "They agreed to bribe Paul the Benjaminite, may God curse him, and charged him with propagating the religion of Jesus, may peace be upon him."²² This mission of corruption had not ended with the rise of Islam. Islamic "heresies" like Shi'ism were, according to Ibn Ḥazm and many others, the invention of a Jewish convert.²³ And of course the Jews continued to pose a clear and present danger in Ibn Ḥazm's own day, when (according to him) Muslim rulers were being corrupted by Judaism: "It is my firm hope that God will treat those who befriend the Jews and take them into their confidence as He treated the Jews themselves. . . . For whosoever amongst Muslim princes has listened to all this and still continues to befriend the Jews, holding intercourse with them, well deserves to be overtaken by the same humiliation and to suffer in this world the same griefs meted out to the Jews."²⁴

Ibn Ḥazm's explanation of how Jewish materialism corrupts the godly Islamic state is very similar to, and just as revolutionary as, its Christian analogues in the same period. It is also very similar to, and just as revolutionary as, the writings of many modern Muslim theologians concerned about the crisis of Islam. Compare Sayyid Quṭb, sensationally called "Al-Qaeda's Philosopher" by the *New York Times Magazine* in 2003.²⁵ Quṭb (1906–66), a philosopher and theologian executed by Nasser for his role in the Muslim Brotherhood's more radical wing, wrote a number of books and pamphlets in which he analyzed the materialist corruption of modern life.

Quṭb placed the origins of this corruption with Judaism. First the Jewish emphasis on ritual and law had made spirituality a matter of rote. Then, when Christianity came along to correct this, Judaism corrupted Christianity through the influence of Saint Paul. It was Paul, according to Quṭb, who had introduced into Christianity the fatal concept of a separation between the physical and political world, on the one hand, and the spiritual world, on the other. One result of this separation was that the Christian West became atheistic and joined Judaism in its war against the rule of God on earth. Only Islam remained to struggle for the spiritual life against the Jewish forces of materialism.

It was because they recognized Islam's role in this struggle that the Jews, ever since their first encounters with Muhammad, had continuously plotted to destroy Islam. The Qur'an was a record of their stratagems and their allies in the early stages of this war. The lessons of that book should be used to meet the danger now, in the modern period, when the Jewish enemies of Islam are many and powerful: Zionists, of course; "Jewish" thinkers like Marx, Freud, and Durkheim; supporters of Israel like Harry Truman; but also every advocate of the separation of church and state and, above all, the many secularist Muslims who pollute Islam with modern ideas. All of these Qurṭb called "hypocrites," citing Muhammad's words in Sūra 2, and all of them he associated with Judaism: "Anyone who leads this Community away from its religion and its Qur'an can only be a Jewish agent, whether he does this wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly," even if he calls himself a Muslim and bears a Muslim name.²⁶

I must apologize for the haste of my treatment. Some five hundred years, and many differences of time and space, separate each of these Islamic texts from the next. I have stressed the similarities here in order to make a point. Like Christianity, Islam has a tendency to use the Jews as a foil with which to think about the proper order of the world. Muhammad, Ibn Ḥazm, and Sayyid Qurṭb all define the divinely governed Islamic state against the negative image of a hypocritical, materialist, God-hating Jewish enemy. The continuity is all the more striking because in none of these cases are the Jews the real enemy. Muhammad's more significant rivals were the Arab clans in Mecca and Medina that refused to recognize his claims to exercise divinely ordained political authority over them. Ibn Ḥazm's were the feuding Islamic princes and the invading Christian reconquerors that had brought Muslim Spain to the brink of collapse. Sayyid Qurṭb's were the secular liberal states of the West and their Muslim clients. All three focused their critical attention on the Jews, not because the Jews were the real enemy, but because the logic through which they understood the relationship between the material and the spiritual depended on the enmity of the Jew.

The same, I submit, is true today. For more of the world's population than ever before, Jewish (or Zionist) enmity is the preferred language in which to express a desire for revolution and freedom. Through it the political and religious aspirations of millions of Muslims are deflected away from the regimes under which they live and projected against a distant enemy. (I am not speaking here of the Palestinians, whose aspirations to sovereignty are directly

expressible in anti-Zionist terms.) The third world projects into it all protest against the systematic injustice of the world order (recall, for example, the focus of the United Nations' Durban World Conference on Racism in 2000). And for Europe it increasingly serves to exorcise any number of evils. Colonialism, racism, globalization, and American hegemony: all of these oppressions are understood as "Zionist," "Jewish," and "American" according to the logic of "postmodern" anti-Judaism, a logic that unites both right and left. In the nineteenth century it used to be said that hatred of Jews was "the socialism of fools." In the twenty-first we might say that the same fools confuse attacks on Zionism with protest against what they view as a new imperialist, hyper-capitalist, American world order.

Throughout this epilogue I have called this anti-Judaism "a logic." By using the word "logic" I do not mean to imply that it makes *accurate* sense of the world. I mean only that, for many people, it seems to have made *adequate* sense, sense enough to be useful and convincing. The complexity of the world makes the gap between the two, between accurate sense and adequate sense, in many ways unbridgeable. What depresses about the logic of anti-Judaism is that it seeks to widen that gap, not narrow it. Even more depressing is just how many people prefer that wider gap. Consider only one last example: explanations for the events of 11 September 2001. Saddam Hussein, for instance, composed an open letter to "the nations of the world" shortly after the tragedies, explaining that "the security of America and the security of the world can be obtained if . . . America liberates itself from its nefarious alliance with Zionism, which has never ceased plotting to exploit the world in order to plunge it into blood and darkness, and is using America and certain Western countries to that end."²⁷ Judging from recent polls, it seems that a majority of Europeans, and many Americans, would agree with at least the first half of his statement.²⁸ And of course we all have personal anecdotes about coming face-to-face with more conspiratorial versions of the same general theme, not only abroad but also among Americans themselves. Last year, for example, I found myself on an airplane sitting next to two strangers who were eager to convince me that Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, perpetrated the attacks. This view is astoundingly common and was even espoused by some mainstream media outlets in Islamic and European countries. In this case, however, my conversation partners were leaders of American educational institutions, namely, the chief academic officer and the multicultural affairs director for the Washington, D.C., Public School District. The Jew as enemy has even

become a touchstone in critiques of the global economic order, as it has not been since the first half of the twentieth century. Left-wing anti-globalization protesters, for example, find it once again meaningful to chant slogans like “Nazis, Yankees, and Jews: no more chosen peoples,” while right-wing neo-Nazis talk of the “Jew World Order.”

Why has the United States become “Judaized,” transformed into the “Great Satan” of Islamist, third-world, and European revolutionary rhetoric? Why were we the target on 11 September? Is it because of the Jews? By now it should be clear that this question is badly put. Undoubtedly American policy in the Middle East has powerful effects on the lives and beliefs of people in that region. But those perceptions, as well as those of many other peoples in other regions of the world, are also mediated by ways of thinking about power and materialism that have nothing to do with the United States’ relationship to Israel or its own Jewish population. In fact the United States was already “Jewish” long before Israel was established, and even before the great waves of Jewish immigration reached its shores in the early twentieth century. It was Jewish because of its economic culture, not because of its demography. In 1911, when Werner Sombart wrote in his *Jews and Modern Capitalism* that “the United States owe their very existence to the Jews . . . for what we call Americanism is nothing else, if we may say so, than the Jewish spirit distilled,” he was following a well-trod path, already marked by the feet of Hegel, Marx, and many other European luminaries.²⁹

Even if the United States abandoned Israel and expelled its Jews (as a Saudi newspaper exhorted it to do after 11 September), even if “the Jews leave planet Earth and their property is given to the Muslims,” as the North African *Jama’a Islamique* demands, the United States would remain a “Jewish” power for those who fear its material ascendance. For it is not Jewish power that produces anti-Judaism, but anti-Judaism that “Judaizes” power.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Throughout I have limited citation to basic bibliographic materials easily available in English. Paula Fredriksen, *Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews: A Jewish Life and the Emergence of Christianity* (New York: Random House, 1999), 119–54.

2. *Ibid.*, 248.

3. The altarpiece (W.442) is known as the Stein Quadriptych after the dealer in whose collection it first came to light. For a fuller discussion of the work, see my “Innovation and Copy in the Stein Quadriptych of Simon Bening,” *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 4 (1979): 274–98, and, more recently, Thomas Kren and Scot McKendrick, *Illuminating the Renaissance: The Triumph of Flemish Manuscript Painting in Europe*, exhibition catalog (Los Angeles: John Paul Getty Museum, 2003), 458–60, no. 146, and Lynn Ransom, *The Stein Quadriptych: Facsimile and Commentary* (Lucerne: Faksimile Verlag, 2007); I thank William Noel for this last reference.

4. As noted also by Debra Taylor Cashion, “The Man of Sorrows and Mel Gibson,” in *Tributes in Honor of James H. Marrow: Studies in Painting and Manuscript Illumination of the Late Middle Ages and Northern Renaissance*, ed. Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Anne S. Korteweg (London

and Turnhout: Harvey Miller Publishers, 2006), 139–45. She shows not only that the devotional image of the Man of Sorrows was imbricated in virulently anti-Jewish rant but that it also consecrated the violent extirpation of Jewish communities. This line of argument is further developed in a probing examination by Mitchell B. Merback, “Fount of Mercy, City of Blood: Cultic Anti-Judaism and the Pulkau Passion Altarpiece,” *Art Bulletin* 87 (2005): 589–642.

5. Gibson’s admitted reliance on Emmerich, widely discussed at the time of the film’s release, is noted passim in much of the literature cited in note 8 below. For a convenient source of documentation, see Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, “The Medieval Passion Play Revisited,” in *Re-Viewing the Passion: Mel Gibson’s Film and Its Critics*, ed. S. Brent Plate (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 3–19, esp. 13–14 and 19 n. 23. On late medieval passion tracts as the probable source of Emmerich’s “visions,” see James H. Marrow, *Passion Iconography in Northern European Art of the Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance: A Study of the Transformation of Sacred Metaphor into Descriptive Narrative*, *Ars Neerlandica*, 1 (Kortrijk, Belg.: Van Ghemert Publishing Co., 1979), 197 and nn. 427, 435, 524, 662.

23. The quotation is from the description of Krauskopf as orator by one of the great preachers of the following generation: Israel Levinthal, *The Message of Israel: Sermons, Addresses, Memoirs* (New York: Lex Printing Co., 1973), 145–46.

24. The new institution was hotly contested even within the Reform movement. See Sidney L. Regner, “The Rise and Decline of the Sunday Service,” *Journal of Reform Judaism* 27, no. 4 (fall 1980): 30–38; Michael Meyer, *Response to Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 290–92.

25. Joseph Krauskopf, *A Rabbi's Impressions of the Oberammergau Passion Play* (Philadelphia: Raynor Publishers, 1901). References to this work in the text's following paragraphs are in parentheses. The claim about the innovation of the book is made by William W. Blood, *Apostle of Reason: A Biography of Joseph Krauskopf* (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., 1973), 115.

26. Morris Joseph, *The Spirit of Judaism: Sermons Preached Chiefly at the West London Synagogue* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1930), 214.

27. For a picture of Anton Lang delivering the prologue in 1930 (when his son Alois played Christ), see Hermine Diemer and Franz X. Bogenrieder, *Oberammergau und seine Passionsspiele* (Munich: Seyfried, 1930), and www.donet.com/~devitt/stories.htm. The *New York Times* of 24 October 1915 (11, 17:4) carried a short article entitled “Anton Lang Not Killed: Letter to Relative Here Shows That He Is Not Even Fighting.” The earlier announcement of his death was based on a letter to a different relative, and the article stated, “It is believed that a mistake has been made by confusing the identity of the Oberammergau player with that of a relative of the same name.” For Krauskopf's impression of Lang in 1900, see *A Rabbi's*

Impressions of the Oberammergau Passion Play, 46–47.

28. Florence Kiper Frank, “*The Jew to Jesus*” and *Other Poems* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1915); this poem was cited by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver in his sermon of 20 December 1936 called “The Jew to Jesus.” See Silver, *Therefore Choose Life: Selected Sermons, Addresses, and Writings of Abba Hillel Silver* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1967), 315.

29. Emil G. Hirsch, *My Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 46 (from a Sunday address, “My Religion and the Religion of Jesus”).

30. In his Yiddish manifesto, “Uri Zvi in Front of the Cross,” the words of which are set in the shape of a cross; see David G. Roskies, *Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 268–70.

31. Roskies, *Against the Apocalypse*, 284–85. This painting is used on the cover of Susannah Heschel's *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*.

Chapter 11

1. Emmanuel Levinas, “Loving the Torah More than God,” in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 143.

2. Emmanuel Levinas, “Jewish Thought Today,” in *Difficult Freedom*, 162. Certainly, in the aftermath of Mel Gibson's 2004 film *The Passion of the Christ*, Levinas's words of restraint have a particular resonance, if not also an uncanny prescience and relevance. But the Passion to which Levinas refers is not, of course, “the Passion of the Christ,” historical or filmic, even as he speaks against certain forms of represen-

tational practice and, as well, any displays of authorial or directorial vanity.

3. See Yve-Alain Bois, “On Two Paintings by Barnett Newman,” *October* 108 (spring 2004): 3–34. See also Ann Temkin, ed., *Barnett Newman* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, in association with Yale University Press, 2002).

4. See Ziva Amishai-Maisels, “The Crucified Jew,” in *Depiction and Interpretation: The Influence of the Holocaust on the Visual Arts* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993), 178–97.

5. For a penetrating account of Bacon's work, see Ernst van Alphen, *Francis Bacon and the Loss of Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

6. See Anna Chave, *Mark Rothko: Subjects in Abstraction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

7. See Lawrence Alloway, *Barnett Newman: The Stations of the Cross: Lema Sabachthani* (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1966).

8. See Mark Godfrey, “Barnett Newman's Stations and the Memory of the Holocaust,” *October* 108 (spring 2004): 35–50.

9. Peter Goodrich, “The Iconography of Nothing: Blank Spaces and the Representation of the Law in *Edward VI and the Pope*,” in *Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of the Law*, ed. Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 89–114.

Epilogue

1. On the curious case of Japan, see David G. Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2000); Ben-Ami Shillony, *The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders* (Rutland, Vt.: C.

E. Tuttle, 1992); and most recently Rotem Kowner, *On Symbolic Antisemitism: Motives for the Success of the “Protocols” in Japan and Its Consequences*, Posen Papers in Contemporary Antisemitism, no. 3 (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 2006).

2. An early version of the story is given by Hecataeos of Abdera in his *Aigyptiaka* (ca. 320 B.C.E.), preserved in Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca historica*, 40.3.1–3, ed. and trans. F. R. Walton, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 12:283. Another is that of Manetho, an Egyptian priest in the reign of Pharaoh Ptolemy II Philadelphus (282–246 B.C.E.), who also produced an *Aigyptiaka*. This last was widely disseminated in a version excerpted by Josephus some three centuries later. For recent treatments of this material, see Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 23–54; Peter Schäfer, *Judeophobia: Attitudes Toward the Jews in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 121–69.

3. On the Alexandrian martyrs, see Herbert Musurillo, *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954). The Greek text of the accusation against Trajan is provided on p. 45, that against Claudius on p. 19. For a brief résumé of the events of the war of 115–17 C.E., see John M. G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE–117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996), 78–81. On the holiday, see J. M. Modrzejewski, *Les Juifs d'Égypte, de Ramses II à Hadrien* (Paris: Editions Errance, 1991), 180–81.

4. The debate over Paul's views of Judaism began in his own day and has continued unabated through our own. The thumbnail

sketch in the text above is no more than an extreme distillation of recent scholarship. For an influential example of that scholarship, see E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), and for a recent introductory (albeit polemical) synthesis, John G. Gager, *Reinventing Paul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

5. Philo's quote is from "De Abrahamo," ed. and trans. F. H. Colson, in *Philo*, vol. 6 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 74–75. Compare his "De migratione Abrahami," ed. and trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, in *Philo*, vol. 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 184–85: "we should look on all these [outward observances] as resembling the body, and [these inner meanings as resembling] the soul. It follows that, exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the written laws. If we keep and observe these, we shall gain a clearer conception of those things of which these are the symbols." On Philo's (and later Origen's) Neoplatonic use of the analogy of body and soul for text and meaning, see D. Dawson, "Plato's Soul and the Body of the Text in Philo and Origen," in *Interpretation and Allegory*, ed. Jon Whitman (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 89–107. See also A. J. M. Wedderburn, *Baptism and Resurrection: Studies in Pauline Theology Against Its Graeco-Roman Background* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987).

6. A recent survey, with sections on each Gospel and oriented toward a general audience, is William Farmer's *Anti-Judaism and the Gospels* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1999).

7. The vocabulary of group identity differs from Gospel to Gospel (Matthew and Mark prefer "Pharisee"; John prefers "Jew").

Differences in vocabulary undoubtedly had significance for the sectarian communities that produced these Gospels. In the sectarian context in which Matthew was written, for example, an indictment of the Pharisees need not necessarily have been interpreted as an indictment of all Jews. There is a vigorous strand of New Testament scholarship that invokes this sectarian context as evidence that the Gospels were not essentially anti-Jewish. See, for example, in the case of the verses from Acts 7 cited here: T. L. Donaldson, "Moses Typology and the Sectarian Nature of Early Christian Anti-Judaism: A Study in Acts 7," in *New Testament Backgrounds*, ed. Craig A. Evans and Stanley Porter (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 230–52. Without engaging in this debate, it is enough for our purposes to note that the semantic field of all these terms quickly consolidated into Judaism and was thus interpreted by most readers from the second century forward.

8. On Philo, see note 5 above. Saint Augustine quotes Paul to make the point: "What the apostle says is pertinent to this problem: 'For the letter kills, but the spirit quickens.' That is, when something that is said figuratively is taken as though it were literal, it is understood carnally. Nothing can more appropriately be called the death of the soul than that state in which the understanding, which distinguishes man from beast, is subjected to the flesh in pursuit of the letter." *De doctrina christiana* III.v.9, translation by the author.

9. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 186.

10. For a very early example of this type of Christian heresiography, see *The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis*, trans. Frank Williams, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987–94).

Since each of the later stages of this process has a huge bibliography, the general point will have to remain an assertion.

11. *Sancti Ambrosii Opera*, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 82. pt. 3, ed. Michaela Zelzer (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1982), letters 40 and 41, pp. 145–77. Letter 40.23: "Nil boni huic imminet, rex iste Iudaeus factus est" (p. 173).

12. On these issues in medieval Europe generally, see my "Warum der König die Juden beschützen mußte, und warum er sie verfolgen mußte," in *Die Macht des Königs: Herrschaft in Europa vom Frühmittelalter bis in die Neuzeit*, ed. Bernhard Jussen (Munich: Beck, 2005), 226–41, and for a close reading of a specific Castilian example, my "Alfonso VIII and the Jewess of Toledo: A Political Affair," in *Studies in Honor of Denah Lida*, ed. Mary G. Berg and Lanin A. Gyurko (Potomac, Md.: Scripta Humanistica, 2005), 27–43.

13. Spinoza's discussion of theocracy in *A Theological-Political Treatise* (chap. 17) can serve as an example: theocracy existed only under Moses. Even then, it was designed to lead the polity to destruction, since its terms were dictated by God as punishment for the sin of the Golden Calf. After that destruction, however, no theocracy was possible, for (and these are the opening lines of chap. 18) "God . . . has revealed through his Apostles that the covenant of God is no longer written in ink, or on tables of stone, but with the Spirit of God in the fleshy tables of the heart" (*A Theological-Political Treatise* and *A Political Treatise*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes [New York: Dover Publications, 1951]). In other words, any attempt at theocracy after the coming of Christ is a form of carnal, literal Judaizing, though Spinoza does grant (chap. 19) sovereigns the power to regulate

the outward religious behavior of their subjects when it interferes with the peace of the state. John Locke's "Letter Concerning Toleration" (in *Political Writings*, ed. David Wootton [New York: Mentor, 1993], 390–435) goes further, insofar as it treats as "Mosaic" not only theocracy but also the ruler's punishment of idolatry or any other religious transgressions ("there is absolutely no such thing, under the Gospel, as a Christian commonwealth," *ibid.*, 417–18). In Locke's analysis, the power that Spinoza had granted sovereigns to control the "outward" religious behavior of their subjects now becomes intolerable, precisely because "outward" religious behavior is hypocritical (*ibid.*, 394–95), rule-governed, i.e., "Jewish" (*ibid.*, 414).

14. The phrase was coined by Karl Lueger (1844–1910), whose use of it is analyzed by Carl Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio," in *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (New York: Knopf, 1979).

15. Marx's most famous formulation of this claim, from which this quote is drawn, is his "Zur Judenfrage," in *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Dietz, 1981 [1956]), 347–77, an early text written at a particularly Hegelian stage of Marx's development. On Hegel's deployment of ideas about Jews and Judaism in his philosophy, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

16. The sectarian origins of Islam were influentially suggested by John Wansbrough, particularly in his *Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). An excellent essay focused on some curious strands of "Judeo-Christian" influence is Shlomo Pines, "Notes on Islam and on Arabic Christianity and Judaeo-Christianity," *Jeru-*

salem Studies in Arabic and Islam 4 (1984): 135–52. For a more eccentric contribution on Samaritan influences, see John Bowman, “Banū Isrā’īl in the Qur’ān,” *Islamic Studies* 2 (1963): 447–55. See also Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, *Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 14–15, 21–28. In a number of works Angelika Neuwirth has proposed a method to recover these evolving sectarian layers through a reading of the Qur’anic text. See inter alia her “Erzählen als kanonischer Prozeß: Die Mose-Erzählung im Wandel der koranischen Geschichte,” in *Islamstudien ohne Ende: Festschrift für Werner Ende*, ed. Rainer Brunner et al. (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 323–44.

17. Cf. John Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 64.

18. Ibn Ishāq, *The Life of Muhammad*, trans. Alfred Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 81. Ibn Ishāq’s biography reaches us only in the later recension of ‘Abdu’l Malik Ibn Hisham (died ca. A.H. 218). All citations to Ibn Ishāq here are from the English translation by A. Guillaume. For every tradition reported by Ibn Ishāq there are others, from other traditionalists, that differ; see, for example, Marco Schöller’s reconstruction of traditions gathered by one of Ibn Ishāq’s contemporaries about the Prophet’s conflict with the Jews of Medina: “Sira and Tafsir: Muḥammad al-Kalbī on the Jews of Medina,” in *The Biography of Muḥammad: The Issue of the Sources*, ed. Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 18–48. Finally, this is not the place to enter into the long debate about the reliability of the traditional material in general as historical evidence for “what really happened” in early Islam or of Ibn Ishāq’s material in particu-

lar. For a recent and accessible survey of this debate, see Uri Rubin’s “Introduction: The Prophet Muḥammad and the Islamic Sources,” in *The Life of Muḥammad*, ed. Uri Rubin (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 1998), xiii–xlvi.

19. Ibn Ishāq reports the bewitching at p. 240. The episode was much debated by Muslim scholars, with some (like Mu’tazila) arguing that the Prophet could not be bewitched, and others (Suhayli) opining that he could be, since prophets were not immune to physical afflictions. For some of the many traditions on the bewitching, see Michael Lecker, “The Bewitching of the Prophet Muḥammad by the Jews: A Note à Propos ‘Abd al-Malik b. Ḥabīb’s Mukhtaṣar fī l-ṭibb,” *Al-Qanṭara* 13 (1992): 561–69. Zaynab’s attempted poisoning is recounted in Ibn Ishāq’s *Life of Muhammad*, 515–16. Ibn Hisham’s notes to Ibn Ishāq include Zaynab among the wives: *ibid.*, 794.

20. Ibn Ishāq, *Life of Muhammad*, 239–42.

21. A number of scholars have attempted to evaluate the “relative anti-Judaism” of medieval Christendom and Islam. The most thoughtful attempt I know of is Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

22. The quote about Paul is from ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥazm, *Al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wal-ahwā’ wal-niḥal* [Book of Opinions on Religions, Sects, and Heresies] (Beirut, 1982), 1:325. See Camilla Adang, *Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: From Ibn Rabban to Ibn Hazm* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 105, and Ross Brann, *Power in the Portrayal: Representations of Jews and Muslims in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 65–66, whose translation I have used here.

23. On early Islamic traditions about the Jewish origins of Shī’ī Islam, see Uri Rubin, *Between Bible and Qur’an: The Children of Israel and the Islamic Self-Image* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1999), 168–89. The “Judaization” of Islamic sects by their opponents was a general phenomenon. As Steven Wasserstrom put it in *Between Muslim and Jew: The Problem of Symbiosis Under Early Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 157–58, “it would be difficult to find a Muslim heresy that was not at one time or another traced back to a Jewish originator.”

24. Ibn Ḥazm, “Al-Radd ‘alā ibn al-naghriḥ al yahūdī” [The Refutation of Ibn Naghrila the Jew], in *Rasā’il ibn ḥazm al-andalusī*, ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās, vol. 3 (Beirut: Al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 1981), 67, translated in Moshe Perlmann, “Eleventh-Century Andalusian Authors on the Jews of Granada,” *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 18 (1948–49): 281–83. On this treatise, see now Brann, *Power in the Portrayal*, 78–79.

25. Paul Berman, “The Philosopher of Islamic Terror,” *New York Times Magazine*, 23 March 2003.

26. See, for example, his treatise entitled *Ma’rakatunā ma’ā al-Yahūd* [Our Struggle Against the Jews], ed. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rakkābī (Jidda: Al-Dār al-Sa’ūdīyah, 1970). The work is translated, with a lengthy introduction, by Ronald L. Nettler: *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987). The citations here are to pp. 72–73, 75–77, and 83 of Nettler’s translation. For a good sense of how his Qur’anic interpretation structures his view of materialist tyranny’s “Jewishness” and vice versa, see his lengthy commentary to Sūra 2 in *Fi Zīlāl al-Qur’ān* [In the Shade of the Qur’an], trans. and ed. M. A. Salahi and

A. A. Shamis (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999), vol. 1.

27. Extracts from a letter of 29 October 2001, published (in French) by *L’arche*, nos. 524–25 (October–November 2001): 42. The letter was substantially republished by the French nationalist paper *National-Hebdo*, no. 905 (22–28 November 2001): 9, with the title “La réflexion de Saddam Hussein sur les attentats du 11 septembre.”

28. For a scholarly version of the argument that the domination of U.S. foreign policy by Jewish interests is endangering U.S. security, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” [http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/\\$File/rwp_06_011_walt.pdf](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/rwp_06_011_walt.pdf) (accessed 12 June 2006).

29. Werner Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, trans. M. Epstein (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), 30, 38, 44 [translation of *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*, 1911].