

CHAPTER THREE

Race and Religion

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It may be true, as a great pioneer of ‘world history’ imagined, that any historical event or idea in any time and place is in some way connected to every other event or idea in every other time and place: ‘There are no isolated fields of history; everything is interinvolved’ (Hodgson 1967: 6–7). But even if that is the case, only an omniscient being would be capable of chronicling all those connections: perhaps a deity who marks every sparrow’s fall and keeps strict count of all things (as the Gospel – Mt. 10.29 – and Qur’ān – 72.78 – have it). So long as historians are human, provincialism will be an inevitable aspect of our being.¹

It is not for this inevitable particularism that we historians deserve blame, but for our tendency to forget it. On the one hand, we speak of ‘human nature’ on the basis of our own limited experience, confusing the customs of our tribe with the laws of the cosmos. On the other hand, we isolate aspects of culture that in fact are widespread, locating them in particular histories for purposes of praise or blame, or simply because that history is the one we happen to know.

A history that speaks of the invention of ‘rationality’ in a particular time or place, for example, is culpably provincial. So, I submit, is a history that speaks of the invention of ‘racism’. Such histories are today common, perhaps even the norm. ‘Racism so often *appears* as new to historians, as if each had discovered its uniquely originary moment,’ as Ann Laura Stoler puts it (Stoler 1997: 189; emphasis in the original). ‘What is striking is how committed critics of racism remain to such originary quests and what political investments we might have in them’ (189). The historians she refers to were above all modernists. After the Second World War historians more and more often insisted that race, racism and associated concepts are the product of a modern episteme, impossible to conceive of without nation states or colonialism or the transatlantic slave trade, Darwinian theories of evolution or some other necessary condition setting Euro-American modernity apart from other periods and places (Foucault 1997: 65). The tendency extends to many related concepts. To pick a recent example: ‘The roots of the knowledge regime from

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which the concept of heredity emerged extend ... to the early modern period ... This was the period in which Europeans began to conquer the globe, discovering at the same time that they were not its sole inhabitants' (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 2012: 3).

A 'pre-modernist' could rightly object that humans have been discovering difference through travel and migration long before Columbus, indeed for as long as we can know.² In any case, humans are quite capable of creating difference without discovering new worlds, even while remaining entirely at home. Ancient and medieval peoples were constantly constructing differences in order to imagine and represent their own communities (for example, differences between Greek and barbarian; woman and man; slave and free; gentile, Christian and Jew). Moreover, millennia before Darwin, humans were cultivating plants and mating animals, seeking to explain the transmission of desirable and undesirable characteristics across generations, theorizing the heritability of similarity and difference, and applying those explanations to whatever similarities and differences they found it useful to perceive or imagine among themselves.³

Strong analogies between the reproduction of organisms and the reproduction of culture are in fact ancient and widespread. Our word *culture* is itself a product of that analogy, as is our word *race*, which entered the Romance languages in the fourteenth century from the world of horse breeding. We could, if we wished, treat the imaginings this analogy has made possible, wherever and whenever they have manifested, as part of a vast and interconnected world history of *racism*. This approach has the advantage of avoiding arguments that by definition either set the aperture so wide that distinctions become meaningless (e.g. all persistent differences in power constitute racism) or so narrow that it fails to make sense of many modern phenomena that we have historically understood as racism (e.g. racism requires belief in immutable characteristics tied to skin colour).

Whether we connect or separate the imaginings of disparate times and places, whether we choose to emphasize the similarities or the differences between their various reproductive analogies as we create our own particular histories: these are choices that historians are entitled, indeed called upon, to make. We can choose to link Aristotle and Kant, for example, in order to suggest that reproductive analogies are shared across a philosophical tradition we take to be Western, or we could choose to compare the classifications of Aristotle with those of Pāṇini (an Indian grammarian of the fourth century BCE) in order to argue for commonalities across cultures.⁴ As we make our choices, however, we are also called upon to remember that they are contingent and not necessary, made within the framework of our particular interests and the peculiar shape and limits of our own knowledge. When we forget that, our histories turn from critical engagements into blunt instruments of polemics.

Today there is an increasing tendency to reclaim the racist potential of the pre-modern, and to locate it in the discriminations produced by religious difference. I say reclaim, because before the Second World War arguments about the racist nature of religious discriminations were common. In the context of Nazi anti-Semitism in the 1930s and 1940s, historians debated whether or not medieval Spanish Christian discriminations against converts from Judaism had been racial. Medievalists writing in the decolonizing 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, tended to agree that race was a modern, colonial concept, alien to the Middle Ages, part of the cognitive toolkit with which European power had set out to conquer the world. That consensus began to be questioned again in the twenty-first century, by those urging attention to deep and persistent structures of persecution and discrimination in western Europe and its former colonies (Nirenberg

2003, 2007). Among scholars in the United States today, one can detect a sharpening conviction that discovering the racism of the medieval Christian world is an important part of the struggle against racism in our own polities. Thus Geraldine Heng, for example, explores the Christian treatment of Jews and converts from Judaism in medieval England in order to characterize that land as 'the first racial state known to Europe' (2018b: 58).

Is racism the invention of fifteenth-century Iberian Christians, or of thirteenth-century British ones? What are the risks in locating the origins of racism in one time, place, polity and religion? We can embrace the view that the pre-modern work of difference-making can fruitfully be compared to modern concepts of race and still be concerned that claiming to locate the origins of race risks producing partial and provincial histories that replicate the genealogical errors they claim to criticize. What then are we historians to do if we wish to use the study of 'religious' discriminations from the distant past in order to gain a critical understanding of 'racial' discriminations in the present, or vice versa?

There may be as many answers to that question as there are critical historians. This chapter will propose one approach – that of simultaneously constructive and destructive comparison. I will offer historical sketches of two biocultural processes, one in Christianity and one in Islam, each of which can fruitfully be understood as 'racializing'. Of each I will ask similar questions. First, how did episodes of mass conversion or spiritual migration affect thinking about the heritability of certain characteristics within these religions? In other words, did such episodes effect something that today we might call the racialization of religion? Second, how do these episodes relate to each other? Can we speak of their histories in terms of origins, or of a causal or genealogical relationship to each other? Can we say that any of the three religions involved in these episodes – Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – 'invented race' or practiced race-making? I offer both sketches as plausible historical accounts of how these religions generated concepts that lie within the semantic field of race. In treating the sketches side by side, I hope to make clear why neither of these particular histories on their own, nor indeed any other no matter how detailed, can serve as a critical history of race, unless it simultaneously recognizes its own provincialism and its relation to other potential histories.

The Almohad movement (1130–1269) imposed a distinctive vision of Islam across vast regions of Iberia and North Africa. Almohad derives from Arabic *al-Muwahhidūn* (those professing the unicity of God). The Almohads conducted purges of other *Islamic* schools, and most importantly for our purposes, they also converted, killed or expelled many Jews and Christians in the regions that came under their control. Keeping our focus on Jews, we learn from contemporaries such as Abraham ibn Ezra (d. 1167) that entire communities were wiped out through killing or conversion. The events left a profound mark on the future of Jewish ideas about conversion. Both Moses ben Maimon (d. 1204) – Maimonides – and his father were among these forced converts, and their writings on the topic became important sources for later Jewish thought.⁵

But it is the Muslim side that interests us for our present purposes, for this migration of a large number of converts from Judaism into Islam seems to have catalyzed thinking about lineage in Western Islamic lands. The Almohad ruler Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr (r. 1184–98) and his successor imposed a number of distinctions and discriminations upon descendants of these converts. Regulations compelled the descendants to wear 'degrading attire', such as distinctive robes, skull caps rather than turbans (and later, yellow turbans) and a 'distinguishing sign'. According to the description of these discriminations in al-Marrākushī's chronicle of 1224, the rulers were motivated by doubt about the sincerity of the new Muslims' belief:

Were I sure that they were true Muslims, [the Caliph Abū Yūsuf] would say, I would allow them to merge with the Muslims through marriage or in their other affairs. If, however, I were sure that they were Infidels, I would have their men slain, their children enslaved and their property confiscated and distributed among the Believers. But I have doubts about their case.

(Ibn Zikrī 2016: 19)⁶

We will avoid the temptation so often indulged by historians to hypothesize about the sincerity of converts or their descendants and focus instead on the discriminatory pressure imposed upon them and on the logic of lineage that came to justify that discrimination. The philosopher and exegete Joseph ben Judah ibn 'Aqnīn (c. 1150–c. 1220), who wrote around the time of Abū Yūsuf's rule and was in all likelihood a coerced convert to Islam like Maimonides, describes this pressure in his *Ṭibb al-nufūs* (Hygiene of the Souls). He depicts a society in which 'Jewishness' served Muslims as a transposable sign of dishonour or stigma:

When [a Muslim] wishes to exaggerate a state of scorn or humiliation that has befallen him or his fellows, he exclaims 'My shame was like that of the Jews.' Similarly if they seek to offend a neighbor, after having exhausted all other insults ... they exclaim: 'What a Jew!' Likewise if they want to curse someone ... they say: 'May Allāh make you like them and count you among their number!'

(Fenton and Littman 2016: 53)

'Jew' here serves as an insult by analogy, one that dishonours by equating any Muslim to a people considered base and abject. Ibn 'Aqnīn describes yet another Jewish stigma, one applied not to all Muslims, but only to those descended from Jewish converts to Islam, a stigma that depends not on analogy but on lineage:

The more we obey their instructions and comply with their doctrines and forsake our own, the more they burden our yoke and increase our travail ... The proof can be seen in the afflictions suffered by the apostates of our land ... Even the conversion of their fathers or grandfathers a century ago has been of no advantage to them.

(Fenton and Littman 2016: 51)

Not even intermarriage could erase the stigma. The children of an 'old' Muslim with a female Jewish captive or convert 'are despised ... so-spurned that even the meanest [Muslim] will not contract an alliance with them' (Fenton and Littman 2016: 53).⁷

According to Ibn 'Aqnīn, a century of Islam could not purge a lineage descended from converts of its 'Jewishness'. With the benefit of greater hindsight, we can add that half a millennium would not suffice. In lands that had come under Almohad rule, especially the Maghreb (roughly equivalent to modern Morocco), Muslims belonging to lineages descended from converts from Judaism came to be known as *muhājirūn* (émigrés). The Arabic word had been used positively in the context of early Islam to describe those believers who emigrated from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet Muhammad. In parts of North Africa, however, it came to mean the descendants of converts from Judaism to Islam. (In Fez, members of these lineages were also known as *bildī* [Indigenous].⁸)

We could follow the history of discrimination against the ‘émigrés’ across dynasties – Almohad, Marinid (1244–1465), Saadian (1549–1659), Alaouite (b. 1666) – all the way into the twentieth century. That history produced a great debate between, on the one hand, those who argued that the Islamic tradition justified and even required the stigmatization and segregation of the Muslim ‘émigrés’ from Judaism because of their lineage, and on the other, those who argued that the tradition forbade any such discriminations among believers. The debate left its traces in many different registers of North African culture and society: in genealogies, of course, shaped as they were by taboos on intermarriage; but also in mysticism and politics; in market regulations and Qur’ān interpretation.

Great Sufi masters were caught up in the question. When Ibn ‘Abbād al-Rundī (d. 1390) proclaimed it blasphemy to say that the prophecy of Moses was superior to that of Muhammad, he was presumably attacking the ‘émigrés’ and their defenders, who were sometimes caricatured as upholding the law of Moses. His disciple Muhammad Ibn al-Sakkāk (d. 1415) followed in his master’s footsteps when he declared that the city of Fez pleased him because the *muhājirūn* were despised there (al-Rundī 1986: 53–4; 2005: 235–41).⁹ More than a century later, the Moroccan Sufi Sīdī Riḍwān al-Januwī (d. 1583) compared his own ritual status to carrion and refused any invitation to lead prayers, knowing that his lineage would prove a source of controversy should he assume such an honoured role.¹⁰

Sīdī Riḍwān is an unusual figure, his father apparently was a convert from Christianity and his mother a convert from Judaism. But he was typical in that although his descentance from converts did not bar him from a reputation for piety, it did bar him from the acquisition and performance of institutional power based on that piety. In this sense, the discriminations against the ‘émigrés’ were deeply political. In fact, in the politics of the Maghreb after the Almohads, insisting on one’s family’s distance from lineages of ‘Jewish’ Muslims became a key strategy in struggles for power and privilege.

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the claims to power of the *shurafā’* (sing. *sharīf*) that emerged with increasing stridency beginning in the twelfth century: that is, of lineages that claimed direct descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and who argued that both political and prophetic power should be restricted to members of the Prophet’s lineage.¹¹ In post-Almohad North Africa, the privileges of the *shurafā’* were often articulated by arguing for the exclusion of the *muhājirūn*. Over time the two groups, *shurafā’* and *muhājirūn*, descendants of Muhammad and descendants of Jews, came to stand in stark antithesis. On the one hand, the *shurafā’* were ‘a blood aristocracy ... that implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – carried with it the notion that some of the gifts of the Prophet (and even prophecy itself, a most heterodox belief) were hereditary’ (García-Arenal 2012: 162). On the other stood the *muhājirūn*, presented by their critics as an anti-prophetic lineage of descendants from Jews, whose blood transmitted the spiritual disabilities heaped upon that people.

As one example of this politics of discrimination, consider the centuries of conflict over whether or not Muslims descended from Jews could sell goods in the great market of Fez, known as the Qaysārīya. Descendants of Jewish converts were repeatedly and violently evicted from and readmitted to this prime property for commerce in luxury goods. According to their critics, this was because they preserved the deceitful, fraudulent business practices of their ancestors, and could not be trusted to sell to ‘old’ Muslims. The discovery at the market site in 1437 of the tomb of Mulay Idris II (d. 828), ‘great-great-great-great-grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, ‘founder’ of the Islamic Maghreb and genealogical touchstone of the *shurafā’*, should be understood as itself a product of

that conflict. The 'discovery' converted the market into a shrine to the political, religious and economic claims of the *shurafā'*, a monument that performed its truth through condemnation and exclusion of the *muhājirūn*. Later *shurafā'* historians would even use that exclusion as a barometer of the piety and legitimacy of past monarchs.¹²

This debate over the legitimacy of discrimination was not one-sided. In 1641 the scholar Maḥammad b. Aḥmad Mayyāra (d. 1662) collected seventeen fatwas and several administrative decrees, all from the sixteenth century, and all condemning the exclusion of 'Muslims of Jewish descent' from the Fez market. He also penned his own critique of the discriminatory measures of his day. If the descendants of converts are to be excluded, writes Mayyāra (2013), then no Muslim could shop in the market, for are not all Muslims descendants of converts?¹³

Mayyāra knows that it is only the descendants of converts from Judaism who are targeted (Mayyāra 2013: 142). Yet he does not hesitate to widen the issue to genealogies more generally, pointing out that they and the claims based upon them are often invented, and that this applies as much to the *shurafā'* as it does to the *muhājirūn*. Mayyāra even suggests that the 'old' Muslims attack the 'new' Muslims so viciously because they are covering up anxieties about their own lineage. He points out that many of the *shurafā'* of Fez are immigrants from Iberia, refugees from the collapse of Islamic Andalusia. Perhaps they boast in order to conceal the likelihood that their own ancestors were converts from Christianity? (143–4). In any event, they forget that the Prophet Muhammad disapproved of boastfulness about one's origins (121, 143, 168–70).

Mayyāra draws repeatedly on early Islamic traditions in which the Prophet forbade any discrimination against converts on occasions when Arab Muslims asserted the perceived inferiority of Persian, Jewish and African converts. In this he was following the previous scholars whose farwas he collects, such as Ibn Ḥarzūz (d. 1554), who had quoted Muhammad's 'Farewell Address', in which the Prophet was said to have reiterated that all Muslims are brothers and that it is only in piety that one Muslim is superior to another. After citing this and other Quranic verses and hadiths about all converts being equal except in the degree of their piety, Ibn Ḥarzūz had gone so far as to single out the virtues of the Jewish converts in Fez, 'who hasten to do God's will' (Mayyāra 2013: 106–7).¹⁴

Mayyāra does not single out the descendants of Jews for praise. He does, however, insist that to the extent that the Prophet's descendants, the *shurafā'*, forget that it is only in piety that Muslims are superior to one another, they fall into blasphemy and will be punished for it in the afterlife, for God cares more about good behaviour than family ties to Muhammad (Mayyāra 2013: 132). Nor can custom or long tradition suffice to justify the *shurafā'* in their discrimination. On the contrary, says Mayyāra, legitimations self-interestedly based on tradition are no different than the arguments of the Jews, who say they are following their rabbis and forefathers in denying the prophethood of Muhammad. The twist is clever: now it is the *shurafā'* who are acting like Jews (161).

Not surprisingly, the traditions of discrimination continued to flourish despite Mayyāra's efforts. Almost a century later, another learned inhabitant of Fez and descendant of Jewish converts, Maḥammad Ibn Zikrī (d. 1731), directed yet another treatise against those traditions (Ibn Zikrī 2016). *A Sip of Honey on the Eminence of Israelites and Arabs* – the title is probably not the author's (Ibn Zikrī 2016: 77–8) – is less concerned with discrimination in commerce and more with the exclusion of Muslims of Jewish descent from official scholarly positions and the refusal of 'old' Muslims to marry into 'new' Muslim families. Like Mayyāra and many authors before him, Ibn Zikrī draws heavily on

an egalitarian strand of Islam that stresses the equality of all believers before God. Unlike Mayyāra, who had taken aim at genealogical pretensions generally, Ibn Zikrī took the very different approach of seeking to destigmatize Jewish lineage by ennobling it. Are not the Jews descended from prophets? Ibn Zikrī deploys classical hadith, as well as later commentaries (such as Ibn Taymiya's), in order to grant that the descendants of Ismael are the best of Abraham's line, but claim simultaneously that Isaac's descendants – that is, the Banū Isrā'īl – are the best among the non-Arabs because as a people they were given both prophethood and the revelation of scripture. Muslims of Jewish descent therefore combine in their person not only the truths of Islam but also the prophetic lineage of Israel, and should be honoured rather than scorned.¹⁵

Thanks to an anonymous commentator on Ibn Zikrī's treatise, we know something of the outrage that this argument about the nobility of Israelite lineage could produce. In any event, neither the argument nor opposition to it was new. We have already provided a fourteenth-century example of the latter, in the Sufi master Ibn 'Abbād al-Rundī. As for the argument that Israelite lineage ennobles, it could be attributed to the Prophet himself. One of Muhammad's early biographers wrote that after the Prophet conquered Khaybar, he 'left married to the daughter of their king' (Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Hishām 1955: 520). The bride, Ṣaffiya, converted to Islam after her capture in the conquest of the Jewish fortifications of Khaybar in 629. An Islamic tradition recounts that one day Muhammad found his new wife weeping bitterly. When he asked her why she wept, she replied, 'I heard 'Ā'ysha and Ḥafṣa jeering at me saying, "We are superior to Ṣaffiya for, not only are we the prophet's wives, we are also his cousins!"' Muhammad's reply was variously reported, with the most widespread version having him exclaim, 'Why did you not reply to them saying, "How can you be nobler than I whose father is Aaron, whose uncle is Moses and whose spouse is Muhammad?"' (Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1982: 6.128). Ibn Zikrī, Mayyāra and many writers before them draw on stories such as these about Muhammad's marriage to Ṣaffiya to argue that the Prophet did not discriminate against converts from Judaism.¹⁶

This quick sketch of more than half a millennium of debate about the debasement transmitted through the lineages of the *muhājirūn*, and about the special claims to prophecy and authority transmitted through lineage of the *shurafā'*, may suffice to allow a provisional and general conclusion. Across these eight hundred or so years, from the twelfth century to the twentieth, biocultural discourses about 'Jewish' lineages did important work within the North African Islamic community. They provided it with powerful tools of *inter-Muslim* discrimination, exclusion and hierarchalization that we may, for certain purposes and questions, usefully understand as analogous to race and racism.

Now let us cross the Straits of Gibraltar, whose scant 7.7 nautical miles of salt water mark a now millennial religious, cultural and political divide, and focus on an Iberian Peninsula under Christian rule. Iberian history has long served as a focal point for arguments about pre-modern race because, as is well known, the peninsular kingdoms were among the most religiously diverse in medieval Western Europe. By the end of the thirteenth century, the peninsula was largely ruled by Christian sovereigns (even the Muslim rulers of Granada were officially vassals of Christian kings), but its kingdoms still retained large populations of Muslims and Jews. In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, those lands underwent massive attempts to eliminate that religious diversity through massacre, segregation, conversion, Inquisition and expulsion. In one sense these efforts towards homogeneity were successful. Over the course of the hundred years that

stretched from the massacre and forced conversion of Jews in 1391 to the expulsion of all Jews from the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon in 1492 and from Portugal in 1496–7, virtually all the Jews of the peninsula were either converted or expelled. (The conversion and expulsion of the peninsula's Muslims would follow a related but different and later chronology.)

The conversion of a large number of people whom Christians had perceived as profoundly different did not abolish the old boundaries and systems of discrimination but rather transformed them. The migration of tens of thousands of Jews into Christianity proved to be a powerful catalyst of thought about the relationship between genealogy and religion in modernity: a revolution in both Christian and Jewish understanding of the relationship between flesh and spirit.¹⁷ It produced an enormous debate about the relationship between fleshly lineage and spiritual attributes, as well as new institutions (such as the Inquisition) and qualifications for power (such as 'purity of blood'), all devised to discriminate between Christians descended from Jewish converts (*Cristianos nuevos, confesos, conversos, marranos*) and those who were 'old Christians', 'clean Christians', 'Christians by nature' (*Cristianos viejos, limpios, de natura*).

That the ideological underpinning of these new discriminations claimed explicitly to be rooted in natural realities is evident in what came to be called the doctrine of *limpieza de sangre*. According to this doctrine, Jewish (and later Muslim) blood was inferior to Christian. The possession of any amount of such blood made one liable to heresy and moral corruption; therefore, any descendant of Jews (and later Muslims), no matter how distant, should be barred from church and secular office, from any number of guilds and professions, and especially from marrying Old Christians.

It is precisely in the context of this time, place and problem that the Romance word *raza*, whence our English term *race*, migrated from the vocabulary of horse breeding to that of human reproduction, where it was applied to those Christians whose lineage carried taint of Judaism (and eventually, of Islam).¹⁸ By 1611, when Sebastian de Covarrubias published his famous dictionary, the ambivalence of the word *raza* was long established: 'the caste of purebred horses, which are marked by a brand so that they can be recognized ... Race in [human] lineages is meant negatively, as in having some race of Moor or Jew' (Covarrubias 1611: s.v. 'raza').¹⁹

The word seems to have come into broad usage as a term in the animal and the human sciences more or less simultaneously. The earliest use I know of in Castilian, from a translation of a Latin veterinary manual made in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, uses the term to refer to an equine hoof disease. In the world of horse breeding it came to mean something like 'pedigree' by the first quarter of the fifteenth century (Borgognoni 1999).²⁰ Thus Manuel Dies's popular manual on equine care (c. 1430) admonished breeders to be careful in their selection of stock:

For there is no animal that so resembles or takes after the father in virtues and beauties, nor in size, or coat, and similarly for their contraries. So that it is advised that he who wishes to have good race and caste of horses that above all he seek out the horse or stallion that he be good and beautiful and of good coat, and the mare that she be large and well formed and of good coat.

(Dies 1424–36: 1.1)²¹

At more or less the same time, in Castilian poetry *raza* emerged as a way of describing a variety of defects linked to poetic speech, to sexuality, and especially to Judaism. By 1470

the word *race* was so common in poetry that it was included, along with other useful words such as *marrano* (a word that meant pig and descendant of converts from Judaism), in handbooks of rhymes for poets.²²

As the defects encoded in *raza* became more 'Jewish', they were enriched with meanings drawn from the more agricultural corners of the word's semantic field. Alfonso Martínez de Toledo, writing around 1438 in the midst of an evolving conflict over *converso* office-holding in the Castilian city of Toledo, provides a clear example of the developing logic. You can always tell a person's roots, he explains, for those who descend from good stock are incapable of deviating from it, whereas those of base stock cannot transcend their origins, regardless of whatever money, wealth or power they may obtain. The reasons for this, he asserts, are natural: 'Nature procures this.'

Thus you will see every day in the places where you live, that the good man of good *raça* always returns to his origins, whereas the miserable man, of bad *raça* or lineage, no matter how powerful or how rich, will always return to the villainy from which he descends ... That is why when such men or women have power they do not use it as they should.

(Martínez de Toledo 1992: 108–9)

In these early applications of *raza* to the political fitness of humans, the word is already saturated with contemporary 'common sense' knowledge about the reproductive systems of the natural world.²³

The application of the word to human lineages coincides perfectly with efforts to bar converts from Judaism and their descendants from power. In 1433 Queen María ruled on behalf of the converts of Barcelona that no legal distinction should be made between 'natural' Christians, on the one hand, and neophytes and their descendants, on the other (Colegio Notarial de Barcelona 1965: Archive of the Crown of Aragon, Chancery register 3124, 157r–v).²⁴ The following year the ecumenical Council of Basel included among its many conciliar decrees a prohibition on such discrimination, 'since [the converts] became by the grace of baptism fellow citizens of the saints and members of the house of God, and since regeneration of the spirit is much more important than birth in the flesh' (Mansi [1759] 1961: 29.100). It is because many were making precisely those distinctions that the highest authorities of Church and kingdom found it necessary to issue such decrees.²⁵

By 1449 the logic of discrimination was powerful enough to animate a civil war. When the city of Toledo joined others in revolt against the monarchy, it claimed that the rebellion was a defensive act against the iniquities of *converso* officeholders. The rebels and their sympathizers claimed that 'baptised Jews and those proceeding from their damaged line' were waging an implacable war against Christianity and seeking power partly in order to stain the 'clean blood' of 'old' Christians through intermarriage (Benito Ruano [1957] 1976: 103, 111, 118). Hence the Toledans issued a *Sentencia-Estatuto* banning descendants of converts from holding public office for at least four generations. This was the first of the Castilian statutes of 'purity of blood' that would shape the reproductive imagination not only of the Iberian Peninsula but also of much of the New World for the next five hundred years.²⁶

These claims did not go unanswered. The texts produced by the defenders of the *conversos* – important churchmen, such as Alonso de Cartagena, Juan de Torquemada and Lope de Barrientos, as well as royal officials, for instance Fernán Díaz de Toledo – constitute a corpus of powerful arguments against discriminations of faith amongst

Christians on the basis of descent, much like the works of Mayyāra, Ibn Zikrī and others in Islamic North Africa. The arguments are often strikingly similar. Like their Muslim counterparts, these authors combed early Christian texts in order to demonstrate that the discriminations were un-Christian and heretical. And like their Muslim counterparts, they sometimes found themselves proposing their own logic of lineage in order to preserve the possibility of political and religious power for descendants of converts.

Circa 1441, for example, as the claim that *raza* barred *conversos* from nobility gained strength, the great Castilian expert on chivalry Diego de Valera suggested that descent from the 'chosen people' ennobled rather than debased the 'New Christians' (Valera 1959: 102–3). In 1449, responding directly to the Toledan rebels in his *Defense of the Unity of Christendom*, Bishop Alonso de Cartagena did not entirely reject his opponents' theses about the biological reproduction of culture. He argued instead for a different starting point. True, Jews are ruinous and cowardly, but this is because they were enslaved in unbelief after the coming of Christ. The Old Testament had famously chronicled the courage of the ancient Israelites:

As Aristotle would have it, among dispositions toward virtue none is more derived among descendants through propagation of the blood than the disposition that tends toward fortitude ... Therefore since, considering their small number, proportionally more from among these [descendants of Jews] rise to investiture in the orders of knighthood, than from among those who descend from some rustic family of ignoble commoners ... it follows that we should presume that the nobility that some of them had in ancient times, lies latent enclosed within their breasts.

(Cartagena 1943: 217)

Once baptized, the fortitude encoded in ancient Jewish blood would be free to shine once more, like a bright light whose concealing bushel basket is removed.²⁷

It should not be surprising that such pro-*converso* arguments share a logic of lineage with the discriminations against which they tilt, since they are a reaction to new mappings of reproductive logic from the sphere of nobility onto that of religion. As those new mappings gained exclusionary power, their targets sometimes stressed counter-genealogies. In Inquisition files of the 1480s we find accusations of a *converso* proverb: 'Cristianos de natura, cristianos de mala ventura' (Christians by nature are Christians of bad fortune). In their defence, the accused testified that they had meant that *conversos* shared the lineage of the Virgin Mary, whereas old Christians were descended from idol-worshipping gentiles (Marín Padilla 1988: 60–7). Much like Ibn 'Abbād al-Rundī confronting similar claims of the *muhājirūn* in the 1390s, or Ibn Zikrī's anonymous reader reacting with scorn to *A Sip of Honey* in mid-eighteenth-century Fez, the inquisitors treated such claims as evidence of Judaizing and blasphemy, themselves symptoms of the ruinous effects of Jewish blood.

I have offered two parallel histories of biocultural logics emerging from mass conversion, one very well known (who has not heard of the Spanish Inquisition?), the other virtually undiscovered, the domain of two or three specialists. What questions can the historian ask with this comparison in hand? A searcher after the 'origins' of race might now be tempted to shift those origins from the forced conversions of Jews in Christian Spain to the earlier Almohad conversions of Jews to Islam that may have influenced them. Another, interested in transatlantic futures, might grant that the histories of Islam and

Christianity were intimately intertwined in the Western Mediterranean, but insist that only the biocultural fantasies minted in Christian Spain really matter, because it was the Spaniards who went on to colonize the New World. Still another, aware of the important role that Maghrebi centres of learning played in the Islamization of sub-Saharan West Africa, might ask how North African ideas about conversion and lineage contributed to the willingness of Muslims to sell other Muslims into transatlantic slavery. Yet another might focus on the comparison itself: what was shared and what was different in the intertwined histories of North Africa and Iberia that catalyzed these mappings of lineage onto faith? From the comparison, can we deduce key social, political, theological or intellectual variables in that catalysis of 'racism'?²⁸

We are free to choose between these and many other instructive paths, each of which may be useful for a particular purpose and history. We should recognize, however, that every path is partial and provincial. And we should not imagine that anyone will 'discover' the 'origins' of race or racism in Christianity or Islam. After all, the biocultural imagination of these religions was not invented with the appearance of *conversos* or *muhājirūn*. On the contrary, in both traditions, the medieval debates we have explored were already deeply marked by earlier products of that imagination.

The arguments about purity of blood in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Toledo, for example, frequently invoked the actions of the seventh-century Visigothic kings and bishops of the Peninsula, imagined as founders both of Spain's aristocratic lineages and of its Catholicism. King Sisebut had ordered his Jewish subjects baptized by force around 615, and in the years following both his bishops and his successors to the throne codified legislation placing those converts and their descendants under certain ongoing disabilities.²⁹

Those texts were frequently invoked in Castilian debates over purity of blood nine centuries later. But the texts and their effects were not merely Iberian. The seventh-century canons regarding converted Jews in Visigothic kingdoms made their way into Gratian's *Decretum* in the twelfth century, becoming law for the universal Church. They thereby shaped the possibilities of existence not only for converts from Judaism and their descendants, but also for sixteenth-century *moriscos* in Iberia, for the cruelly evangelized in Africa and the 'New World', for the kidnapped and baptized Edgardo Mortara in the nineteenth century and for so many other converts to Christianity and their descendants across time and space.³⁰ Should we then search for the 'origins' of Christian racial thought among the Visigoths and their treatment of forced converts from Judaism in the early seventh century?

Similarly, in the Muslim debates over the *muhājirūn*, the sources deployed by both sides had been shaped by centuries of earlier arguments about the reproduction of piety. In their struggles against discrimination, Mayyāra (2013: 95–7, 101, 111, 120, 163, 171, 186–7) and Ibn Zikrī (2016: 13, 85–6, 102, 110, 141 [Arabic pagination]) redeployed arguments from the so-called *shu'ūbīyah* controversies of the third Islamic century (c. 800–900 CE), whose name derived from a word in a verse of the Qur'ān:

Oh mankind! Truly We created you from a male and a female, and We made you peoples (*shu'ūb*) and tribes (*qabā'il*) that you may come to know one another. Surely the most noble (*akram*) of you before God are the most reverent (*atqā*) of you. Truly God is the Knowing, Aware.

(*al-Hujūrāt* 49.10–13)

There is a tension within this verse, which on the one hand emphasizes God's creation of social and kin categories – a creation that is explicitly presented as generating useful knowledge about people on the basis of those categories – and on the other stresses differences in piety as the only ones relevant to nobility before God.³¹

The *shu 'ūbīyah* serves as an inexact name for the controversies that engaged multiple aspects of this tension in a period when the passage of time and the conversion of large numbers of non-Arabs to the faith had put pressure on the genealogical privileges of those who claimed descent from Arab conquerors. The controversy confronted those who defended the excellence of Arab lineages with those who elevated other lineages (such as the Persians) or who argued for the radical equality of all believers. The debate did not take long to reach Islam's westernmost shores. In al-Andalus we find the descendants of Christian converts to Islam penning treatises attacking the genealogical claims of their Arab lords and asserting the superiority of their own Iberian lineages, treatises that evoked numerous and ferocious responses. Might these have influenced the later development of genealogical thought in the Iberian Peninsula? Should we then assert that racial thought in the Western Mediterranean, Islamic and Christian alike, was forged much earlier and farther to the East, in the Islamic *shu 'ūbīyah*?³²

It is tempting to declare this or that period or place as the wellspring of biocultural imaginaries in Christianity or Islam. But every foundation stone we might pick reveals others underneath. Ibn Qutayba (d. 889), one of the great polemicists of the *shu 'ūbīyah*, points to the ancient philosophers and to the poets of the Arabs:

The sages say: 'Nature prevails.' A poet has said as much:

What one contrives against his nature, / will be abandoned as character prevails.

Another poet has said:

All return to their essence, / though they may affect different traits for a time.

(Ibn Qutayba 2019: 145–6)³³

(Compare this expression of 'common wisdom' about lineage to that of Alfonso Martínez de Toledo cited above.) As for prophetic forebearers, Ibn Qutayba mocks the Persian writers with their 'claims of a relationship to Isaac, son of Abraham, and with their boast, aimed at the Arabs, that Isaac was born from Sarah, a free woman, whereas Ishmael, the father of the Arabs, was born from Hagar, a slave' (Ibn Qutayba 2019: 47).³⁴ According to him, the late eighth- to early ninth-century poet Abū Nuwās denigrates the Arabs for being descended from a slave, an 'unclean' or 'putrid smelling' woman. The Persians, counters Ibn Qutayba, were in no way related to Abraham, whereas the Arabs' descent from his concubine is an honourable rather than a degrading status, as Ibn Qutayba then goes to some lengths to prove.³⁵

Already in the earliest Christian and Islamic 'Middle Ages', amongst Germanic and Arab conquerors alike, we can find powerful flashes of the idea that lineage and the reproduction of the flesh condition proximity to prophecy and divine favour. Why is this potential to map religion and culture onto reproduction and the creaturely body (or vice versa) suddenly activated and put to work in certain times and places? How does a given activation transform the possible futures of this potential? And how do these activations compare to what we have learned to call racism in other times and places? These seem to me better questions for the historian of race than the question of 'origins'.

The word *potential* has the advantage of reminding us that within these religions (as in many other cultures) the conditions of possibility for this mapping of religion onto reproduction exist even when they are not actualized. The story of the family of Abraham we have just seen invoked by Ibn Qutayba is one of many bearers, within these traditions, of the potential to imagine that prophecy reproduces itself like the organism. That potential is already contained in the language of the promise God makes to Abraham in Genesis 17.7: 'I shall maintain my covenant between myself and you, and your seed [Hb. זרע, Gk. *sperma*, Lt. *semen*] after you, generation after generation' (translation mine). Both New Testament and Qur'an agree: 'Now the promises were addressed to Abraham and to his seed [*sperma*]' (Gal. 3.16). 'Truly God chose Adam, Noah, the House of Abraham and the House of 'Imrān above the worlds, as progeny [*dhurrīyah*], one from another. And God is Hearing, Knowing' (Qur'an 3.33–4).³⁶

Potential does not mean origin. There were many great cultures in the ancient world – Babylonian, Egyptian, Sasanian and so on – that imagined aspects of their reproduction in terms of nature and agriculture in ways that shaped the material collected in the Hebrew Bible. What makes this biblical example of the metaphor important is not its 'originality' but the prophetic work it would be put to by different cultures in the future. Already in Genesis, that work can focus on heightening the prophetic claims of a particular family or expand to encompass the entire world: 'I will give to your seed all these lands, and in your seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed' (Gen. 26.4–5, 28.13–14, 22.16–18). At times across future centuries (as in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, heavily influenced by their Sasanian context) it will be used to heighten the claims of lineage and heritability. At others, as among some early rabbis and most famously by the apostle Paul, it will be used to efface those claims: 'There can be neither Jew nor Greek ... for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And simply by being Christ's you are that seed [*sperma*] of Abraham, the heirs [*klēronomoi*] named in the promise' (Gal. 4.28–9; see also Gal. 3.16, 3.26–9, 4.13 and Rom. 9.6–8).

But at no point did the metaphor lose its potential to generate multiple imaginings of the relationship between reproduction and the potential for godliness. Not even Paul's momentous spiritualization abolished from the movement that came to be called Christianity the possibility of imagining that the reproduction of godliness and the flesh are related. We can glimpse such possibilities in Paul's own writings, as for example in his prohibition on mixed marriages (2 Cor. 6.14–7.1; Hayes 2002: 92–8). We can glimpse them in the genealogies of Jesus provided by the gospel authors (Mt. 1.1–17; Lk. 3.23–38). We can even see how the early Christian struggle over rights to Abraham's lineage could potentially produce an alternate lineage for the Jews ('You are from your father the devil' [Jn 8.37–44]). And we can attempt to trace, if we wish, the biocultural imaginings that these passages potentiated across many Christian futures, including in our own times.³⁷

In other words, we could write a history of the 'racialization of religion' that begins with the genealogical ideas that Muhammad and his *muhājirūn* brought with them in their migration from Mecca to Medina at the foundations of Islam. We could also write one that begins with Paul's epistles (Buell 2004, 2005). We could join the long list of those who have looked back to Abraham's migration from Ur in Genesis 12 and blamed the Israelites and their scriptures for attaching prophecy to the loins of lineage.³⁸ Or we could seek to situate the earliest Israelite imaginings in the context of other Near Eastern ideas about lineage and prophecy (Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian/Zoroastrian, etc.) in which they arose and were repeatedly transformed, redacted and re-redacted.

In every case we could claim that we had discovered within these religions the actualization of one potential among many: the potential to map the reproduction of culture onto the reproduction of the organism. We can and should compare that actualization to other mappings in other times and places, and ask how these relate to one another, and how they might contribute to a critical history and theory of race. But we should not imagine that the actualizations we discover constitute the origins of racism or the essence of those religions. For when we do so, we ourselves yield to a historical logic of lineage that is itself akin to that family of concepts we call race.

really speak about the arrivals and migrations and displacements of people around the world. And the Great Hall, of course, is this place of people entering and people leaving. In the left painting, *Welcoming the Newcomers*, Miss Chief is literally bending over to assist people arriving to North America. That has to do with generosity. In the second painting, *Resurgence of the People*, Miss Chief is commanding this boat, which looks a lot like a migrant vessel, and many people across the world are being displaced from their own lands. Miss Chief is leading this resurgence of the people to represent a return to our languages and a return to our traditions' (Monkman, Kent 2019).

- 28 On the relationship of Black and Indigenous identities within North American tribal nations (both those recognized by the American federal government and/or American state governments, and those who as yet lack that recognition), see Hlebowicz's nuanced account of language revitalization that draws attention to the complex situation of the Lumbees living in what is now North Carolina; the Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape, in southern New Jersey; and the Ramapough Lunaape Nation, in northern New Jersey and the border with New York (2019: 61–2): 'Four hundred years of contact with more powerful European colonizers gradually changed Indian communities into tiny pockets of people living on obscure reservations (e.g. Pequots in Connecticut or Pamunkeys, Mattaponis in Virginia) or dispersed among much greater non-Indian populations, intermarrying with other ethnic groups and even seen as "coloured", "Mullatoes" or "Black", not Indians anymore' (58).

Chapter 3

- 1 Translation of verses from the Qur'ān are from Nasr et al. (2015).
- 2 For two examples of this complaint, see Loomba (2009) and Nirenberg (2009).
- 3 See, for example, the Loeb Classics edition of Pseudo-Aristotle (*Problems* 878a, 20–8; Aristotle 2011) and Lehoux (2014).
- 4 I do not know of any work comparing Aristotle and Pāṇini's reproductive analogies, but for a comparative approach that opens philosophical horizons, see Staal ([1965] 1988).
- 5 For a general survey of the Almohads, see Bennison (2016). Fierro's work in the field has been fundamental; see her essays collected in Fierro (2012). On their conversionary policies, see Fierro (2010) and García-Arenal (1992: 95). Stroumsa (2009) provides a sophisticated treatment of the impact of the Almohads on Jewish thought. For debates over Maimonides' conversion, see Kraemer (2008: 116–24).
- 6 The story is told by 'Abd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī (1963: 383), who had connections to the Almohad court, in his history of the Almohads. See also the earlier edition by Reinhardt Dozy (al-Marrākushī 1881: 223–4). I cite here the translation by Paul Fenton, whose work on the North African converts (Ibn Zikrī 2016) is indispensable for the topic.
- 7 Joseph ben Judah ibn 'Aqñīn is discussed by Fenton (Ibn Zikrī 2016: 15–18). The citations are from his *Ṭibb al-nufūs* (Ben Judah Ibn 'Aqñīn n.d.: 143a–6).
- 8 On the use and various etymologies of *bildī*, see Fenton (Ibn Zikrī 2016: 23–5).
- 9 Ibn Sakkāk is quoted by Ibn Zikrī (2016: 135 [Arabic pagination]), who disputes that Ibn Sakkāk could ever have made such a statement (27).
- 10 Al-Januwī is the subject of ongoing research by Manuela Ceballos, whose unpublished manuscript 'Theology from the Margins: Sidī Riḍwān al-Januwī and his Community of Outsiders' (n.d.) brought him to my attention. Her work is largely based on the unpublished biography written by his disciple Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sijilmāsī (n.d.; Rabat, Bibliothèque Générale, MS 114K). She cites the point about leading prayer from page 92 of Vincent Cornell's (unpublished) transcription of that work. It may be that certain schools of Sufism were more open to *muhājirūn* than others. See Fenton (2005: 513–20).

- 11 See Goldziher, Van Arendonk and Tritton (1960–2007) and Van Arendonk and Graham (1960–2007) for a general discussion of the development of the concept of *sharif/sayyid*. For the Maghreb, see García-Arenal (2006).
- 12 For a (probably eighteenth-century) example of such a history, see Fathah (2004). The treatise traces the history of the Qaysāriya back to the reign of Mulay Idris (d. 791) and claims that throughout the history of Fez, rulers permitted *muhājirūn* to sell in the markets or hold administrative positions only when the rulers were weak, illegitimate or impecunious. Strong, legitimate rulers properly favoured the *shurafā'*. On Idris and the *shurafā'*, see Beck (1989: esp. ch. 4).
- 13 Mayyāra's point that all Muslims are converts so all would be excluded from markets by this discriminatory logic (2013: 141) is borrowed from the earlier fatwa of al-Kharrūbī (d. 1556), included by Mayyāra in his compendium (2013: 93). On Mayyāra, see García-Arenal (1991). See also (more generally) García-Arenal (1987).
- 14 The 'Farewell Address' contains exhortations to the early Muslims about social relations. Hadith collections, Quranic commentaries and biographies of the Prophet written in the centuries after his death give various versions and pieces of the speech and place it in different times of his career. Some of the modifications (not included in the six canonical hadith collections) contain statements about the equality and brotherhood of Muslims, whether Arab or non-Arab, black or red. The address is itself an excellent example of how foundational texts could be used and even transformed in an ongoing debate about identity and discrimination, whether tribal, ethnic or religious. See Mottahedeh (1976: 164) and Marlow (1997: 24–5).
- 15 Ibn Zikrī discusses Muhammad's marriage to Jewish converts (Ibn Zikrī 2016: 66–7 [Arabic pagination]), the relationship between Ismael's and Ishaq's descendants (16) and Jewish descent from prophets (134).
- 16 Another version reads 'My father is Ishāq, my grandfather Ibrāhīm, my uncle Ismā'īl, and my brother Yūsuf.' In biographical sketches, Şafīya was given a tribal genealogy stretching back to Levi son of Jacob. For examples of her use in these debates see Mayyāra (2013: 163) and Ibn Zikrī (2016: 18, 49, 67, 77 [Arabic pagination]). Not all stories about Şafīya were so positive. Compare Ibn Ishāq (1955: 517), in which Abū Ayyūb fears that Şafīya will attempt to murder the Prophet.
- 17 For more detailed treatment of these transformations in the Jewish, Christian, and convert communities, see Nirenberg (2002).
- 18 Spitzer (1941) suggested that *race* derived from Latin *ration*. The proposal was strongly rebutted by Contini (1959, 1970), who proposed its derivation from old French *haraz/haras*, the stallion's deposit. See also Wartburg (1960: 111) and Sabatini (1962). Merk (1969) attempted to defend Spitzer's alternative etymology, to which Coluccia (1972) provided a rebuttal. None of these utilize the sources I touch upon above.
- 19 Examples of such usage are legion. A particularly famous one is that of Pineda ([c. 1589] 1963–4: 410): 'Ningún cuerdo quiere muger con raza de judía ni de marrana.'
- 20 'La.x. titulo dela enfermedat. que dizen raza. // Faze se alos cauallos una malautia quel dizen Raça. Et faze se de sequedat dela unna.' This particular manuscript is from the fourteenth century, but the Catalan translation claims that the Castilian translation was made at the command of Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252–84).
- 21 On this work, see Cifuentes and Ferragud (1999). For the Castilian translation by Martín Martínez de Ampíes, see Dies ([1499] 1992).
- 22 For multiple examples of *raça* in the late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century Castilian poetic corpus, see Nirenberg (2009: 249–50). For the 1470s see Guillén de Segovia (1962: s.v. 'raça').

- 23 Much of this 'common sense' could also be found in ancient authors whose prestige in the medieval Christian and Islamic worlds of learning was immense. See for example Aristotle's *History of Animals* (7.6 on the resemblance of children to their parents, and cf. his *On the Generation of Animals* 1.17–18) or Xenophon's *On Hunting* (3, 7 on breeding of dogs).
- 24 The use of the phrase *by nature* to distinguish old Christians was already common by this date.
- 25 For examples of attempts at discrimination in the 1430s, see Nirenberg (2002: 23–4).
- 26 The texts connected with the controversy have recently been gathered and reedited by González Rolán and Saquero Suárez-Somonte (2012).
- 27 The metaphor is a reference to Jesus' rebuke of the Pharisees in Mt. 5.15; Lk. 8.16, 11.33; Mk 4.21.
- 28 For a (far too) strong thesis about the impact of Iberian ideas of purity of blood in the New World, see Sweet (1997). On the importance of Islamic ideas about blackness in structuring the massive slave trade of the Muslim world, see Gomez (2005: 35–40; 2018: 43–57). (Gomez does not, however, touch upon Maghrebi discussions of lineage and conversion.)
- 29 The *Fuero juzgo*, a thirteenth-century translation of the Visigothic *Liber iudiciorum*, transmitted aspects of this legislation into civil law. See, for example, *Fuero juzgo* (1815: 179). Vidal Doval (2020) has studied the use of these texts in the Toledo controversies of the fifteenth century.
- 30 The famous canon *De Iudeis* (*Corpus iuris canonici*, Dist. 45, c. 5, in Friedberg and Richter 1955: 161–2), for example, corresponds to canon 57 of Toledo IV (Martínez Díez and Rodríguez 1992: 235). On how the Visigothic conciliar decrees entered canon law, see Marmursztejn (2016: 233–40; 2019). See also, from the same volume, Poutrin (2020).
- 31 On the *shu 'ubīyah* controversy, see now Savant (2016), Szombathy (2005) and Larsson (2005). Classic studies include Goldziher (1966: 137–98), Gibb (1962) and Mottahedeh (1976). See more generally Marlow (1997).
- 32 Writing in Cordoba, around 940, Ibn 'Abd Rabbih provides one example of the reach of the *shu 'ubīyah* controversy into the Iberian Peninsula (Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1982: 3.403–8). A century later the Muslim convert (or descendant of converts) from Christianity Abu Amir ibn García al-Bashkūsi (i.e. *el vascuense*, the Basque) produced a treatise that provoked no less than five surviving replies penned over the following centuries. See Monroe (1970) and Larsson (2003).
- 33 Arabic: Ibn Qutayba (1998: 186). Ibn Qutayba includes a section on horses in his treatise on the *shu 'ubīyah* (120–7; 2019: 101–4) and also gives detailed information about them in several other books, including his *Adab al-kātib*, *Kitāb al-Ma'ānī al-kabīr* and *'Uyūn al-akhbār*.
- 34 Arabic: Ibn Qutayba (1998: 46).
- 35 See also Savant (2006); and more generally, Firestone (1990). See also Szombathy (2003: 114).
- 36 Compare the saying attributed to Muhammad: 'God chose Kinānah from among the children of Ismā'il, and He chose the Quraysh from the Kinānah, and He chose from the Quraysh the Banī Hāshim, and He chose me from the Banū Hāshim' (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* 2276, in Ibn al-Ḥajjāj 1994: 15–16.38).
- 37 To give just one medieval example: in fifteenth-century Iberia, Alonso de Espina asserted the demonic lineage of Jews (Espina 1494: 2.79, col. d). See Ginio (1998: 16–17). In 2018, Robert Bowers invoked John 8.44 to justify his murder of eleven Jews in a Pittsburgh synagogue (see Zaimov 2018).

- 38 This list includes modern as well as medieval thinkers. The nineteenth-century Spanish scholar Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo believed the Jews had invented the racism that was then 'turned against them' (Menéndez y Pelayo 1946: 408). The eugenicist Alfred Schultz (1908) took a similar position. More recently Winthrop Jordan ([1968] 1977) placed ancient Jewish exegesis of the curse of Ham at the origins of his history of racism, as does Ivan Hannaford (1996: 100–15).

Chapter 4

- 1 I cite Devisse as well as Bindman and Gates to acknowledge the groundbreaking work of the earlier scholarship, and because the 2010 English re-issue sometimes presents materials in slightly different formats.
- 2 The Turkish conquest of Constantinople interrupted the slave trade from the Black Sea area. In the Eastern part of the Iberian Peninsula, Black African slaves are present from the second quarter of the thirteenth century, but they became more numerous from the later fifteenth century onwards, with the development of direct slave trade from West Africa to Portugal and Spain. See Verlinden (1955: 225–6, 270–3, 282–6; 1977), Epstein (2001) and Blumenthal (2009).
- 3 A considerable number of studies examine the representation of Black Africans in medieval art, exegesis, travel and vernacular literature. Apart from *The Image of the Black (L'Image du noir)* 2.1 (Devisse 1979a; Bindman and Gates 2010), see Mielke (1992), Metzler ([1997] 2009), the contributions to the special issue 'Race and Ethnicity in the Middle Ages' of the *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* (Hahn 2001b) and Martin (2001).
- 4 This chapter builds on van der Lugt (2005, 2018). I only touch upon the question of the reproductive and sexual functions of Black women, a theme discussed by Biller (2005). See, however, note 26 below. In updating I have made use of an English translation of the earlier article from 2005 by Thomas Hahn, to whom I extend my warmest thanks.
- 5 I have not encountered this description in other medieval sources. The opening of mouths suggests the inspection of slaves. One of Albert's sources, the *Pantegni* of Haly Abbas, gives instructions for examining the bodies of slaves but does not mention their mouths (1.24, 'De signo sani corporis' (Haly Abbas n.d.: fol. 5v–6r; 1515: fol. 4r–4v). I have not found clear references to these passages in the *Pantegni* in Latin sources.
- 6 However, in his *Expositio problematum Aristotelis* 10.67 (10.60 in the Greek), Pietro d'Abano distinguishes between the Ethiopians, who he says live close to the equator, and Black people generally, who people a larger area: 'Quare est quod dentes ethiopum habitantium primum clima ad meridiem et universaliter nigrorum quod est ab extremitate tercii climatis versus torridam zonam sunt albi' (Pietro d'Abano 1482: no foliation).
- 7 See Wartburg et al. (1922–2002: 6.1.554, s.v. 'maure') and, for example, Jacques de Vitry, *Historia orientalis* prologue (Jacques de Vitry 1986: 52–3). The prologue is now considered inauthentic.
- 8 *Questiones salernitane* B46 (see Lawn 1979: 23).
- 9 Alexander von Roes, *Memoriale* ch. 15: 'Et dicuntur Gallici secundum quosdam a nitore corporum; galla enim grece, latine dicitur lac; et hanc expositionem vocabuli ego reprobare non debeo tamquam ab antiquis traditam. Verum est quod respectu Hispanorum vel Maurorum nitent corpore aliquantulum albiores; respectu vero circumiacentium provinciarum, videlicet Saxonum et Anglorum, nullatenus a nitore corporum dici possunt' (1958: 107).
- 10 The fifteenth-century German translation edited in the same volume also lacks the term *maurus*. Instead, it mentions people inhabiting Spain and the Mediterranean.
- 11 For the meaning of *glaucus*, see Pastoureau (2000: 25–7).

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OF RACE

IN THE
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